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RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TORTS OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
That a general employer is not ordinarily responsible for the
negligence of an independent contractor or his servants is fa-
miliar tort dogma. The reason usually stated by the courts is
that one ought not to be responsible for the torts of those over
whom he has no control., A recent writer has shown that a more
IScammon v. Chicago, 25 Ill. 425, 437 (1861); 2 MECnEra, AGENCY (2d
ed. 1914) § 1917; Note (1929) 17 GEo. L. J. 336, 337.
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plausible basis for the general doctrine may be found by an
analysis of the problem in terms of administration of risk.2 The
many cases which refuse to permit insulation from responsibility
through an independent contractor, however, also merit careful
consideration.
At the outset any hope of reconciling the cases or of formulat-
ing general rules must be abandoned. The fact situations involved
are so varied, the importance of numerous details so great, the
influence of extra-legal factors so uncertain, that any generaliza-
tion sufficiently broad to be of value in explanation or prediction
is too broad to be useful; whereas any usable generalization
would probably be too narrow to be of value. The most that can
be done is to point out some of the more tangible forces influenc-
ing the decision of a particular case.
The problem in the independent contractor situation differs
somewhat from that in most tort cases in that the essential ques-
tion is not whether the injured party shall recover but rather
from whom he shall recover. In most cases, i.e., whenever the
actual tort is committed by the employees of the independent
contractor, neither potential defendant seems even morally re-
sponsible. Moral and sentimental side-issues are therefore more
easily made subordinate to the pragmatic problem.
From a pragmatic viewpoint the allocation of such a loss in-
volves both prophylactic and remedial factors. In connection with
the former, society must consider first, methods of avoiding the
loss, by not undertaking the business at all, and second, methods
of preventing the loss, by taking the usual precautions. Likewise,
in connection with the latter it must consider, as a matter of
salvage, first, means of assuring certainty of compensation to the
injured party, and, second, means of shifting or distributing the
loss. 3 In terms of such concepts a possible justification of the
general rule of non-responsibility of the employer has been sug-
gested: that "while the independent contractor stands in no bet-
ter position than the general employer to avoid, shift, or dis-
tribute the risks he does seem to occupy a more strategic position
to prevent them." 4 Do the exceptions which have been made to
2 Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 88
YAu L. J. 584.
3 See Douglas, op. cit. supra note 2, where substantially the same analysis
is developed in detail. By "shifting" the loss is meant getting rid of it
through the process of insurance; by "distributing" it, "recoupment by
distributing the cost of assumption among the consumers of the product."
4 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 2, at 602. Professor Douglas points out
that any distribution of such cost items by the contractor is necessarily
through the employers and "since the employer will get them eventually it
could be argued that it would seem simpler to place them on him directly
and in the first instance." He believes, however, that the greater ability
of the contractor to prevent the injury might well outweigh this considera-
862 [Vol. 89.
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the rule involve any additional elements which consciously or
unconsciously influence the courts to arrive at a different result?
Before discussing the more modern cases one other factor must
'be considered, namely, the influence of the historical develop-
ment. In 1799 the problem of an independent contractor was
for the first time clearly presented in Bush v. Stein7Lom. There
the owner of a house was sued for an injury resulting from the
plaintiff's colliding with a pile of lime placed in the road by the
servant of a lime burner furnishing lime to a carpenter who
had contracted to repair the house. The court, despite "great
difficulty in stating with accuracy the grounds for liability," held
the house owner responsible, partly as a matter of convenience
to the plaintiff and partly because he was "the person from
-whom the whole authority was originally derived." The idea
of an independent contractor as an entrepreneur, conducting
and controlling his own business, was apparently a concept with
which the court was unfamiliar at the time.0
The Bush case was followed in two minor decisions at Nisi
Prius,7 but in 1826 the famous case of Laugher V. Pointe'r8
completely changed the complexion of the law. The owner of
a carriage who had hired horses and driver from a livery stable
was there held not responsible for the negligent operation of
the carriage by the driver. As a result of this decision the Bush
case was first slighted as being concerned only with injuries
arising in connection with real property 0 and was finally dis-
carded altogether.'0 For a quarter of a century the insulation
tion. It may be added that in many cases the employer is himself the ulti-
mate consumer and in such a situation the risk could more effectively be
distributed by the independent contractor.
51 Bos. & P. 404 (1799).
6 See especially the opinion of Rooke, .
7 Sly v. Edgley, 6 Esp. 6 (1806), where a bricklayer employed to sink
a sewer left an open excavation into which the plaintiff fell. Matthews v.
West London Water Works Co., 3 Campb. 403 (1813), where a stage coach
was wrecked by rubbish thrown in the street by contractors engaged to
lay pipes.
8 5 B. & C. 547 (1826).
9 Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499 (1840) (facts similar to the
Laugher case); Milligan v. Wedge, 12 A. & E. '737 (1840) (servant of
licensed drover careless in driving defendant's bullock through the town) ;
lapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710 (1842) (explosion of gas due to negli-
gence of gas fitter making repairs); Allen v. Hayvard, [1845] 7 Q. B. 9C0
(plaintiff's land flooded by negligence in erecting bank). But cf. Randle-
son v. Murray, 8 A. & E. 109 (1838), where a warehouseman was held re-
sponsible for the negligence of a master porter in dropping a barrel from
the warehouse on the plaintiff.
10 Reedie v. London & N. W. Ry., 4 Ex. 244 (1849) (workmen negli-
gently allowed a stone from a railroad bridge they were constructing over
a highway to fall on plaintiff).
-1930]
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afforded an independent contractor was apparently complete."
Beginning with Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co.1" in
1853, however, the English courts, seeming to sense that they
had carried the employer's freedom from responsibility too far,
beat a steady retreat. In the Ellis case the plaintiff stumbled
over a pile of stones left in a foot way by employees of an in-
dependent contractor who had just finished filling up a trench
dug for the purpose of laying gas pipes. The work was illegal
in that it had been done without a permit. The court held the
employer responsible on the ground that the primary cause of
the accident was the illegal act for which he had contracted."3
In Pickard v. Smith,' 4 where a coal dealer negligently left open
a coal hole, the doctrine was first promulgated that the duty of
the employer in such a situation to take precautions was one he
could not avoid by entrusting to another. In Gray v. Pullen 1
the employer was made responsible for a contractor's negligence
in filling a drain, the theory being that the Act authorizing the
defendant to break up the street provided that he must keep it
in a safe condition. And finally, in Bower v. Peate,"6 a case
'11In Milligan v. Wedge, supra note 9, Williams, J., said, "The difficulty,
always is, to say whose servant the person is that does the injury: when
you decide that, the question is solved." Coleridge, J., remarked, "Unless
the relation of master and servant exist between them, the act of one
creates no liability in the other." The same sort of language was used in
Overton v. Freeman, 3 Car. & K. 49 (1851), where the servant of a sub-
contractor engaged to repair a street left a pile of rocks in the road,
causing the plaintiff to break his leg. Similar cases where the employer
escaped responsibility are Knight v. Fox, 5 Ex. 721 (1850) and Peachey
v. Rowland, 13 C. B. 182 (1853).
- 2 E. & B. 767 (1853).
is Only Erle, J., seemed worried over the causation factor. The doctrine
that the injury was caused by the very thing contracted for was pushed
to a further extreme in Hole v. Sittingbourne Ry., 6 H. & N. 488 (1861),
where the defendant, authorized to build a bridge, was made responsible
for delay to the plaintiff's boat caused by a defect in construction due to
the negligence of the contractor. An additional factor in the case, which
was mentioned by only one of the judges, was that the act of authoriza-
tion provided that it was unlawful for the defendant or any one acting
under it to detain a ship for a longer time than was necessary to open
the bridge. Pollock, J., did say, moreover, that where a person is authorized
by act of Parliament to do particular work he cannot avoid responsibility
by contracting with another person to do the work. This seems to be the
first mention of the doctrine. See cases cited infra note 33.
14 10 C. B. "(N.S.)470 (1861).
155 B. & S. 970 (1864).
16 [1876] 1 Q. B. 321. Other English decisions extending the doctrines
of Pickard v. Smith and Bower v. Peate which have had much influence
upon later decisions are: Dalton v. Angus, [1881] 6 A. C. 740 (negli-
gence in excavations by contractor caused plaintiff's house to fall) ; Hughes
v. Percival, [1883] 8 A. C. 441 (three houses collapsed as a result of con-
tractor's negligence in cutting into party wall); Black v. Christchurch
Finance Co., [1894] A. C. 48 (fire spread due to contractor's negligence
864 [Vol. 39
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involving injury to the plaintiff's house from excavations by a
contractor on an adjoining lot, the defendant's responsibility
was placed upon the broad ground that "if an employer orders
work from which in the natural course of things injurious con-
sequences will flow unless means are taken to prevent them, he
is bound to see the doing of that necessary to prevent the mis-
chief and cannot relieve himself by employing another."
Meanwhile in America a similar development was taking place
a few strides behind the English cases." One variation in ter-
minology occurred, due to the originality of Judge Dillon. 1
Through his influence the American theory corresponding to that
in Bower v. Peate has come to be stated in the formula: an em-
ployer is liable for injuries caused by the failure of the inde-
in burning brush); Hardaker v. Idle District Council, [1896] 1 Q. B.
335 (explosion due to negligence of contractor in breaking gas main while
constructing a sewer).; Holliday v. National Telephone Co., [1899] 2 Q.
B. 392 (plumber hired to lay pipes negligently exploded his flare and scat-
tered melted lead over plaintiff); Maxwell v. British Thomson Houston Co,
18 T. L. R. 278 (1902) (projecting derrick used by contractor in erecting
telephone poles struck plaintiff riding in a street car).
Cases where the employer was not held responsible in somewhat similar
situations include Gayford v. Nicholls, 9 Ex. 702 (1854) (workmen excavat-
ing on defendant's land shook and damaged plaintiff's building); Steel v.
South-Eastern Ry., 16 C. B. 550 (1855) (contractor working on embank-
ment negligently cut drain overflowing plaintiff's land); Kiddie & Son v.
Lovett, [1885] 16 Q. B. 605 (platform erected by contractor to paint de-
fendant's house fell on employee of contractor) ; Butler v. Hunter, 7 H. &
N. 826 (1862) (contractor negligently knocked down wall of plaintiff's
house in pulling down part of defendant's house). The Butler case was
later disapproved in Hughes v. Percival and Hardaker v. District Council,
both supra.
17 Several early decisions, following the Bush case, did not seem to recog-
nize the modern conception of an independent contractor as an entrepreneur
but held the employer responsible on the theory that he was the "author"
of the work. Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R. R., 23 Pick. 24 (Mass. 1839)
(city recovered contribution for damages paid to traveler injured by negli-
gence of defendant's contractors in placing barriers in the road) ; Stone v.
Cheshire R. R., 19 N. H. 427 (1849) (injury by blasting of contractor).
But cf. Sproul v. Hemmingway, 14 Pick. I (Mass. 1833) (owner of ship
being towed not liable for collision due to negligence of master of the tug).
Later decisions seem influenced by the English cases following the
Laugher case. Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48 (1851) (contractor not liablo
where sub-contractor failed to, put lights at an excavation); Hilliard v.
Richardson, 3 Gray 349 (Mass. 1855) (owner not responsible where car-
penter repairing house left boards on the highway); Scammon v. Chicago,
supra note 1 (landowner not responsible for hole dug in street by con-
tractor constructing building); Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. 213 (1863)
(city not responsible for injury to plaintiff through falling into sewer dug
by contractor); DeForrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368 (1852); Potter v. Sey-
mour, 4 Bosw. 140 (N. Y. 1859); see Note (1902) 2 COL. L. P~v. 112.
1 83The first use of the phrase "intrinsically dangerous" work reems to
be in DILLON, Mu cni'A CoRpoRAioNs (1st ed. 1872) § 792.
1930]
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pendent contractor to exercise due care in the performance of
work which is "inherently" or "intrinsically" dangerous.19 Ex-
cept for this particular, however, the American cases followed
closely the English precedents.
Considering the more modern cases, then, in the light of these
various influences, one may discern several general situations in
which it is probable that the employment of an independent con-
tractor will afford no protection to the employer. In the first
group of exceptions may be gathered those cases where the em-
ployer is usually termed "negligent." Thus it is frequently said
that the employer will be responsible if he is negligent in employ-
ing an incompetent contractor.2 0  Likewise he is often made re-
sponsible where the injury may be traced more or less directly
to defective plans 21 or defective machinery 22 furnished by him;
where the damage is due to a defect created by the contractor but
which the employer might have discovered and remedied; 2 3 or
where, with knowledge of dangerous and unnecessary practices
conducted by the contractor, the employer does nothing to pre-
vent them.2 4 Such cases shade into those where the courts say
19 See cases cited in notes 46 to 56 infra. One writer has attempted to
separate the decisions using this formula from those using the formula in
Bower v. Peate, supra note 16. Note (1923) 23 A. L. R. 1016; Note (1923)
23 A. L. R. 1084. The fact situations are, however, indistinguishable.
Moreover, since, if the employer did take the precautions said to be re-
quired, he would usually be exercising such control as to deprive him of the
defense of independent contractor entirely, the idea is the same in both
approaches.
20 Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55, 21 S. W. 451 (1893); Norwalk Gas-
light Co. v. Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495, 28 Atl. 32 (1893). Some courts ex-
pressly limit the ddctrine to cases where the work is dangerous. Schip v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 64 Minn. 22, 66 N. W. 3 (1896). Others do not appdar
to take it into consideration at all. Berg v. Parsons,' 156 N. Y. 109, 50
N. E. 957 (1898). For a collection of cases see (1905) 41 CAN. L. J. 49,
159 and Note (1905) 66 L. R. A. 941.
21 Starr v. Stanard-Tilton Milling Co., 183 Ill. App. 454 (1913) (defec-
tively planned building caused land under plaintiff's building to give way);
Note (1916) 1 CORN. L. Q. 307.
22 Johnson v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 193 Mo. App. 198, 182 S. W.
1089 (1916) (fire due to defect in threshing machine); Brady v. Jay, 111
La. 1071, 36 So. 132 (1904) (fire due to sparks from defective engine used
by contractor); Willis v. San Bernadino Lumber Co., 82 Cal. App. 751, 256
Pac. 224 (192?) (trucl furnished had no lights).
23 Ramsey v. National Contracting Co., 49 App. Div. 11, 63 N. Y. Supp.
286 (2d Dep't 1900) (lumber piled negligently by contractor caused injury
two weeks later); Hickman v. Toole, 35 Ga. App. 697, 134 S. E. 635 (1926)
(defects due to moving of house by contractor could have been discovered
by ordinary care).
24 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 258 Fed. 697 (D. Md. 1919), 264
Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920) (fire due to practice of dumping ashes into
oily water)%; Bergen v. Morton Amusement Co., 178 App. Div. 400, 165
N. Y. Supp. 348 (4th Dep't 1917) (employer knew of danger of excava-
[Vol. 39
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that interference by the employer has changed the status of the
contractor from that of independent contractor to that of a mere
servant or agent; 25 or become indistinguishable from cases
where the employer is said to have directly authorized the in-
jury. That it is the factor of prevention which is in the mind
of the court seems clear. The cases are all instances of situations
where it was felt that the employer was better qualified to pre-
vent the injury and that consequently the general rule of non-
responsibility should not apply.
Within a second group of exceptions fall the cases where the
court, as in Pickard v. Smith 2 7 and Gray v. Pulle,25 articulates
its opinion in terms of a "duty" owed by the general employer.
Thus where a statute imposes upon an employer a duty to per-
form some affirmative action it is rarely that he escapes respon-
sibility if injury results from a failure to perform or from.
negligent performance by an independent contractor. Typical
examples of such non-delegable statutory duties are those arising
from municipal regulations relating to precautions to be taken in
the contruction of buildings 20 and in work on the streets and high-
ways. 0 The many and varied duties which have been imposed
upon railroads in the course of their history also furnish interest-
ing illustrations3 Inasmuch as the statute has clearly marked
tion to passersby); see TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d. ed. 1924) § 37, where it is
said: "Practically all of these so-called exceptions are really cases in which
the one hiring the independent contractor is liable in tort by actual partici-
pation in the tort which has caused the damage."25 See cases collected in Note (1922) 19 A. L. R. 1168.
26See cases cited in notes 43 to 56 infra.
27 8upra note 14.
28 SUpr note 15.
2 9 Frostman v. Stirrat & Goetz Investment Co., 65 Wash. 608, 118 Pac.
742 (1911) (plaintiff hurt by board thrown from window where contractor
had not complied with ordinance requiring staging to be constructed over
sidewalk) ; Ward v. Ely-Walker Dry Goods Bldg. Co., 248 Mo. 348, 154 S. W.
478, 45 L. R. A. (N.s.) 550 (1913) (same). But a statute requiring "all
owners, contractors, subcontractors . . . engaged in construction" to
take certain precautions in regard to ropes, scaffolds, and other devices has
been held not to take away the independent contractor defense. Mackey v.
Lafayette Loan & Trust Co., 70 Ind. App. 59, 121 N. E. 682 (1919). And
a statute requiring "owner or contractor" to build a temporary roof over
the sidewalk has been construed as not applying to an owner who hires a
contractor. Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. 288, 75 N. Y. Supp. 913 (1st Dep't
1902).
so Gray v. Pullen, supra note 15; Ackles v. Pacific Bridge Co., 66 Ore.
110, 133 Pac. 781 (1913) ; Girdzus v. Van Etten, 211 Ill. App. 524 (1918).
But cf. McCarthy v. Waldorf System, 251 Mass. 437, 146 N. E. 663 (1925).
31 Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. R. v. Heflin, 65 Ill. 36G (1872) (cow killed
by train due to failure by contractor constructing road to build fences as
required by statute); Boucher v. New York, N. H. & H. R. B., 196 Ma.-
355, 82 N. E. 15 (1907), 13 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1177 (1908) (statute compell.
1930]
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the employer as the person responsible it is not difficult to under-
stand such decisions-at least as long as the injury has some
reasonable connection with the performance of the duty. How-
ever, while the requirements of "proximate cause" are formally
observed, the great lengths to which some courts have gone in
holding the employer for what might be considered "collateral"
acts of negligence by the independent contractor indicate that
the statute is often the feeblest of excuses.
32
A franchise or special permit to do certain work has at times
been held to involve implied duties creating responsibility in
the employer for negligent acts of the contractor occurring in
the course of the authorized work.3  If logically pursued, the
doctrine would seem to apply to all work done by a corporation
through an independent contractor. With the exception of cases
concerning railroads, however, the principle appears to have
been used only where the court was also influenced by other
factors.3
In addition there are various types of work which are said to
ing railroad to maintain gates at grade crossings). See cases collected in
Note (1923) 23 A. L. R. 984.
32 Quanah, A. & P. R. R., v. Goodwin, 177 S. W. 545 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915) (statute required railroads to keep crossings in repair; horse
frightened by rails piled in street by subcontractor); McGolderick v.
Wabash Ry., 200 Mo. App. 436, 200 S. W. 74 (1917) (horse shied at grind-
stone left by contractor near road while cutting brush from defendant's
right of way as required by statute). But of. Missouri K. & 0. Ry. v.
Ferguson, 21 Okla. 266, 96 Pac. 755 (1908) (railroad not responsible for
damage to animal entangled in fence being constructed by contractors in
pursuance of a fencing statute) ; Rinker v. Galveston-Houston Electric Ry.,
176 S. W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (ordinance provided street railways
to construct tracks without depressions between rails; railway not liable
for injuries due to failure by contractor to comply while constructing
tracks).
33 Hole v. Sittingbourne Ry., supra note 13; Deming v. Terminal Ry., 49
App. Div. 493, 63 N. Y. Supp. 615 (4th Dep't 1900) (contractors of a rail-
road, authorized by statute to tear up the streets, left an obstruction with
no lights); Woodman v. Metropolitan R. R., 149 Mass. 335, 21 N. E. 482
(1889) (injury caused by barrier to guard excavation in work done under
permit issued to defendant). But of. Sanford v. Pawtucket St. Ry., 19 R. I.
537, 35 Atl. 67 (1896), 33 L. R. A. 564 (1897) (defendant authorized to
construct railroad not responsible for negligence of contractor in stretch-
ing rope across street). See Note (1902) 15 HARv. L. Rsv. 485. For a
collection of Illinois cases which seem to go further than those of other
states see Gilbert, The Independent Contractor Under the Law of Illinois
(1908) 2 ILL. L. REv. 361.
3 See cases cited in note 33 supra and in notes following. Duties creat-
ing similar responsibilities are also at times said to arise from contract.
Maryland Dredging and Contracting Co. v. Maryland, 262 Fed. 11 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1919) (employer contracting to transport employees to work held
responsible for negligence of contractor running boat). See Note (1924)
29 A. L. R. 736.
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involve absolute common law duties in the sense that the em-
ployer will be held responsible for the contractor's acts of
negligence which are not so remote from the work as to be
considered "collateral." Those most frequently mentioned are
the duty of a municipality to keep its streets in repair,- the duty
to afford one's neighbor lateral support,30 the duty to refrain
from impeding the public in the use of the highways,"r the duty
to refrain from using one's property so as to create a nuisance
or injure another,38 the duty of keeping one's premises reason-
ably safe for those present by express or implied invitation.2
The reason why work involving one of these 'particular duties
should impose a heavier burden upon the employer than work
involving any of the other "duties" underlying negligence actions
seems to a certain extent due to the influence of the English
35 Storrs v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104 (1858) (sewer left unguarded by con-
tractors); Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165 (1861) (same); see Note (1923)
25 A. L. R. 426.
36 Dalton v. Angus; Hughes v. Percival, both supra note 16; Bonaparte
v. Wiseman, 89 Md. 12, 42 AtL 918, 44 L. R. A. 482 (1899) ; Lemaitre v.
Davis, [1881] 19 Ch. D. 281; see (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 407.
3
7 Hardaker v. Idle District Council, supra note 16; Robbins v. Hercules
Gasoline Co., 80 Cal. App. 271, 251 Pac. 697 (1926) (excavation left un-
protected) ; Schiverea v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 89 App. Div. 340, 85
N. Y. Supp. 902 (2d Dep't 1903) (plainti& tripped over cord stretched
across way by contractors constructing subway) ; Ray v. Manhattan Light,
Heat, & Power Co., 92 Minn. 101, 99 N. W. 782 (1904) (coal hole left
open). But of. Brady v. Shepard, 42 App. Div. 24, 58 N. Y. Supp. 674
(1899) (coal hole left open); Crowder v. Emery, 206 IIl. App. 562 (191?)
(obstruction left unguarded); see Note (1900) 14 HARV. L. REV. 62.
38 Scott Construction Co. v. Cobb, 86 Ind. App. 699, 159 N. E. 763 (1928)
(blasting); Van Dam v. Doty-Salisbury Co., 218 Mich. 32, 187 N. W. 285
(1922), 29 A. L. R. 729 (1924) (contractor negligent in removing ice on
-water tank which was so dangerous as to be'a nuisance); Hudgins v. Hann,
240 Fed. 387 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917) (wall remaining after fire fell due to negli-
gence of contractor hired to tear it down); Wilkinson v. Detroit Steel &
Spring Works, 73 Mich. 405, 41 N. W. 490 (1889) (defectively planned
building fell upon plaintiff). But cf. Mann v. Max, 93 N. J. L. 191, 107 A.
41' (1919), 21 A. L. R. 1227 (1922) (owner not responsible for scaffold-
ing built by contractor projecting over sidewalk) ; see Note (1916) 1 Co=u.
L. Q. 307.
39 Besner v. Central Trust Co., 230 N. Y. 357, 130 N. E. 577 (1921),
23 A. L. R. 1081 (1923) (injury to employee of contractor installing elevator
doors due to negligence of independent contractor running elevator) ; Gil-
more v. Philadelphia & Reading R. R., 154 Pa. 375, 25 Atl. 774 (1893) (de-
fect in stairs to defendant's station due to independent contractor); Adams
v. Schneider, 71 Ind. App. 249, 124 N. E. 718 (1919) (grandstand col-
lapsed); see (1921) 31 YALE L. J. 99.
In all these "common law duty" cases, if the injury is due to an act
sufficiently disconnected with the duty the employer will not be made
responsible. Cuff v. Newark & N. Y. R. R., 35 N. J. L. 17 (1870) (injury




precedents of the period of reaction beginning with the Ellis
case. Whether there is any further reason foi the distinction
will be discussed in connection with the "inherently dangerous"
doctrine, as the fact situations of the cases decided according to
the two approaches are generally indistinguishable."
Perhaps the majority of modern cases holding the general
employer responsible are based on the doctrines of Ellis v.
Shffield Gas Consumers' Co.4'1 and Bower v. Peate.42 The pre-
dominant idea in the mind of the court seems to be that "where
damage results directly from acts of the contractor which the
employer expressly authorized or which are necessary to perform
the contract, the employer is liable." The clearest cases falling
within this rule are those where the actual work contracted for
was in itself a tort or a violation of a statute.43 Somewhat an-
alogous are those decisions similar to the Ellis case where the
work contracted for was illegal, but the injury-was caused by
negligent non-compliance with the contract.4 4 The cases then
seem to merge imperceptibly into situations where the injury
resulting from performance of the contract, while not certain,
was highly probable ; ,5and so without a break the movement con-
tinues on into the "dangerous if no precautions are taken"
doctrine of Bower v. Peate, or the "inherently dangerous" doc-
trine of Judge Dillon. Obviously the difficulty of determining
the place at which to stop, as well as of applying the check of
"collateral negligence," is sufficient to cause much disorder
among the cases. Whatever order is to be found is again largely
due to conformity with fact categories established by the English
precedents.
A number of cases in which the court has found the work
"inherently dangerous" or "dangerous unless precautions are
40 Many cases are collected in Note (1923) 23 A. L. R. 984, 1016, 1085;
(1905) 41 CAN. L. J. 49; Note (1905) 66 L. R. A. 941. Not only are the
fact situations usually indistinguishable, but the two ideas also often
converge, as where the court says that the danger creates the duty. See
Besner v. Central Trust Co., supra note 39, at 363, 130 N. E. at 579.
41 Supra note 12.
42 Supra note 16.
43 North American Dredging Co. v. Pugh, 196 S. W. 255 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1917) (dredging channel involved pumping silt on plaintiff's land);
Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Simpson, 182 Ind. 693, 104 N. E. 301
(1914) (contract called for removing some of plaintiff's land).
- Creed v. Hartnan, 29 N. Y. 591 (1864). But cf. Looney v. Prest-0-
Lite Co., 65 Ind. 617, 117 N. E. 678 (1917) (owner not responsible for
defect in building though he had no permit to erect it). Other cases are
collected in Note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 1229.
45 Stout Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 175 Ark. 988, 1 S. W. (2d) 77 (1928)
(contract to cut trees on bank of stream "necessarily" resulted in dam-
ming up stream) ; cf. Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Barter, 218 Ala. 369, 118
So. 749 (1928) (coal mine leased to company which was to mine pillars).
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taken" are concerned with work on the streets involving excava-
tions,46 open trap-doors, 47 obstructions,"" and similar hazards to
the public. 49 Likewise construction work on abutting buildings
which is likely to endanger passers-by often comes within the
same classification.5 The employer is often held responsible
also where the contractor's negligence is connected with excava-
tions on the employer's land creating danger to nearby buildings,
party walls, or people using the streets.51 The rule of Rylands
-v. Fletcher includes within its scope the negligence of an inde-
pendent contractor; 52 and even jurisdictions which do not ad-
here to the doctrine of that case frequently will not allow the
contractor's negligence to excuse the employer in analogous
situations5 3 Finally, while the decisions vary much with con-
ditions, a majority of courts are inclined to find blasting 5' and
exhibitions of fireworks r, to be "inherently dangerous." Out-
46 Thomas v. Harrington, 72 N. H. 45, 54 Atl. 285 (1903), 65 L. R. A.
742 (1904); McCarrier v. Hollister, 15 S. D. 366, 89 N. W. 862 (1902).
But of. Harris v. Farmers' State Bank, 239 S. W. 1027 (Tex. Civ. App.
1922); (1922) 1 TEx. L. REV. 110.
47 McGinley v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., 248 Mlass. 583, 143 N. E.
537 (1924); Cole v. Durham, 176 N. C. 289, 97 S. E. 33 (1918). But cf.
Cary v. Sparkman, 62 Wash. 363, 113 Pac. 1093 (1911).
SMaxwell v. British Thomson Houston Co., supra note 16; cf. Thomas
v. Saulsbury, 212 Ala. 245, 102 So. 115 (1924).
49 Holliday v. National Telephone Co., supra note 16. But cf. Whitehill
v. Hartman Construction Co., 87 Misc. 184, 149 N. Y. Supp. 518 (Sup. Ct.
1914) (employer not responsible where plaintiff tripped over rope stretched
across street from donkey engines to hoist).
50 Doll & Sons v. Ribetti, 203 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 3d, 1913); Privitt v.
Jewett, 225 S. W. 127 (Mo. App. 1920). But of. Smith v. Bank of Com-
merce & Trust Co., 135 Tenn. 398, 186 S. W. 465 (1916) ; see Note (1921)
34 HArv. L. REv. 551; Note (1923) 26 Mo. L. SEE. BuLL. 27.
aHughes v. Percival, supra note 16; Davis v. Summerfield, 133 N. C.
325, 45 S. E. 654 (1902), 63 L. R. A. 492 (1904); Murphy v. Perlstein, 73
App. Div. 256, 76 N. Y. Supp. 657 (1st Dep't 1902); Olah v. Katz, 234
Mich. 112, 207 N. W. 892 (1926). But cf. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 263
Pa. 158, 106 Atl. 238 (1919).
S2Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 H. L. 330 was itself a case involving
an independent contractor.
53 Cf. Bianki v. Greater American Exposition Co., 3 Neb. 656, 92 N. W.
615 (1902) (fireworks); Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Ill. 110 (1877) (city re-
sponsible for blasting though contractor not negligent).
5 Carland & Co. v. Burke, 197 Ala. 435, 73 So. 10 (1916). But cf. Kolb
v. Hayes, 194 Wis. 40, 215 N. W. 578 (1927); (1927) 26"Mxca. L. Rlv.
577. If the blasting is in open country it is more likely to be held not
inherently dangerous. Kendall v. Johnson, 51 Wash. 477, 99 Pac. 310
(1909). And the employer is often not held responsible if he did not
know the contractor contemplated blasting. Seattle Lighting Co. v.
Hawley, 54 Wash. 137, 103 Pac. 6 (1909). Loading dynamite on a ship
has been held not to be. inherently dangerous. Foard Co. v. Maryland,
219 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914).
5 Blue Grass Fair Ass'n v. Bunnell, 206 Ky. 462, 267 S. W. 237 (1924).
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side of the above situations, however, there are but a few scat-
tered instances where the "inherently dangerous" doctrine has
been applied.56 While it has been suggested that the general
tendency is to increase the scope of the employer's responsibility
in these cases, it is difficult to trace any definite trend.r7
Other influences beyond that of tradition are discernible in
the cases comprising this last group of exceptions. In those de-
cisions where the work "necessarily" involved an injury if the
contractor complied with the terms of the contract, not only is
the employer clearly "at fault" but as a matter of administering
the risk he is certainly in the crucial position to avoid the injury
by refraining from undertaking the work. Where the work is
socially desirable, however, as it undoubtedly is in most of the
cases applying the absolute "common law duty" doctrine or the
"inherently dangerous" doctrine, the factor of avoidance should
play no such part. As for preventing the injury in such cases
it would seem that the necessity of leaving the work to the con-
trol of an expert such as the independent contractor now is
presumed to be would increase in proportion to the hazards in-
volved. Futhermore the ability of either party to shift or dis-
tribute the risk does not appear to vary with the amount of
danger inherent in the work.
Unquestionably the factor which makes the strongest appeal to
the courts is the desire to assure certainty of compensation to
the injured party. This is well illustrated by those cases where
the general employer, having been held responsible for the in-
jury, is allowed contribution from the independent contractor. 8
But cf. Deyo v. Kingston R. R., 94 App. Div. 578, 88 N. Y. Supp. 487 (3d
Dep't 1919). See (1904) 18 HARv. L. REV. 144; (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 113.
56 Montgomery v. Gulf Refining Co., 168 La. 73, 121 So. 578 (1929)
(work of delivering gasoline intrinsically dangerous; hence employer re-
sponsible for fire due to contractor's negligence). But cf. Same v. Gulf
Refining Co., 99 N. J. L: 340, 124 Atl. 145 (1924) (removing gas tank
from ground not dangerous work; employer not responsible for fire) ; Swift
& Co. v. Bowling, 293 Fed. 279 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923) (using fire to keep
cement from freezing not dangerous work); Laffery v. U. S. Gypsum Co.,
83 Kan. 349, 111 Pac. 498 (1910) (work in mine not so dangerous as
to make employer responsible for injury due to rock dropping on employee
of contractor).
57 (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 113; Note (1922) 18 A. L. R. 801, 837.
58 Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R. R., supra note 17; Dallas & G. Ry. v.
Able, 72 Tex. 150, 9 S. W. 871 (1888); cf. Scott v. Curtis, 195 N. Y. 424,
88 N. E. 794 (1909), 40 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1147 (1912). The general rule has
been stated to be that where two parties are jointly responsible in respect
of a tort, one for the reason that he is the actual wrongdoer, and the
other for the reason that the tort constituted a violation of positive duty,
the latter is entitled to recover from the former the amount which he has
been compelled to pay as damages. Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 566. In
many cases the contractor expressly agrees to indemnify the employer.
872 [Vol. 39
COMMENTS
But it does not follow that the certainty of recovery of damages
by the injured party should be determined by the degree of risk
involved in the work. To the individual injured this would seem
to be entirely immaterial. To society it might well be more
important to assure recompense to parties injured as a result of
work where a greater number of individuals are likely to be
damaged, though the risk of damage to any one individual in
a position to be injured may be less.
That the pressure to secure certainty of recovery to the plain-
tiff has thus had such an influence upon the so-called exceptions
to the general rule is not without significance. Already the
Workmen's Compensation Acts of many states reflect the same
attitude in making the general employer responsible for injuries
to employees of an independent contractor who, though prim-
arily liable, has not complied with the Act.0 Such legislation
suggests the feasibility of extending the "exceptions" to the gen-
eral rule of non-responsibility to supersede the general rule it-
self. The advantages of affording greater security to the injured
party might well outweigh the prevention factor which now
forms the unarticulated justification for non-responsibility. Or
it might be urged that the prevention of injury will be equally
well taken care of by giving the injured party his election to
sue the general employer or the independent contractor. Such a
rule would induce an employer to make a more careful selection
of a contractor without lessening the stimulus upon the con-
tractor to take the more immediate steps for the prevention of
injury.
Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 IML 331, 141 N. E.
739 (1923); Quanah, A. & P. R. R. v. Goodwin, supra note 32.
The influence of the factor of assuring relief to the injured party may
also be traced in many cases not considered in this comment where the
court must decide the preliminary question of whether a contractor is an
independent contractor. Cf. Sadler v. Henlock, 4 E. & B. 570 (1855) (con-
tractor a mere laborer); Darmstaetter v. Maynahan, 27 Mich. 188 (1873) ;
Wallace v. Southern Cotton-Oil Co., 91 Tex. 18, 40 S. W. 399 (1897) (con-
tractor financially irresponsible); see Note (1922) 19 A. L. I. 1168. The
courts are under a somewhat similar pressure where an injured employee
must decide which of two possible employers he should sue. For a recent
case illustrating this see Campbell v. Connolly Contracting Co., U. S. Daily,
March 14, 1930, at 133 (Minn. 1930).
59 N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, 1923) c. 66, § 56; OnIo GEN. CODE (Page,
1926) § 1465-61.; see Note (1927) 12 CoRN. L. Q. 521; (192) 40 HAnv. L.
REv. 917. The California Workmen's Compensation Act, while excluding
independent contractors from its provisions, also excludes from the clas3
of independent contractors manual laborers. Cal. Stat. 1917, e. 586, § 8 (b);
see (1918) 6 CALap. L. REv. 235.
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ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS MADE BY FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN
VIOLATION OF "ASSUMED NAME" STATUTES
At common law an individual or partnership was privileged
to conduct business under an assumed or fictitious name even
though the name adopted was entirely different from the name
or names of those engaging in the enterprise.1 This common law
privilege, however, has almost universally been subjected to
regulation by statute. Virtually all such statutes require a person
or persons 2 doing business under a designation other than the
proper names 3 of those participating in the venture to file with
some local official, usually the county clerk or the clerk of the
county court, a certificate stating the assumed name of the busi-
ness together with the proper names and post office addresses
of those comprising the firm.4
Examined from the point of view of the penalties imposed for
their violation, the statutes fall roughly into three groups. In
some states fine and imprisonment are the only penalties ex-
pressly set out in the statute.5 In others it is provided that per-
1 See Oppenheimer v. Clemmons, 18 Fed. 886, 887 (C. C. N. C. 1883);
Daugherty v. Heckard, 189 Ill. 239, 245, 59 N. E. 569, 571 (1901); Huoy
v. Passarelli, 166 N. E. 727, 729 (Mass. 1929).
2 Sometimes only partnerships are subject to such regulation. OKLA.
COMP. STAT. (1921) § 8141.
3 The question of what constitutes an "assumed" or "fictitious" name is
beyond the scope of this note. The cases are collected in a Note (1926) 45
A. L. R. 258. That the determination of whether a given designation falls
within the purview of the fictitious name statutes may be influenced by other
than purely factual considerations, see infra note 23.
Several states, in addition to an assumed name statute have a provision
forbidding the use of the words "and company" where such words do not
represent an existing partner. N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) § 82;
LA. CONST. & STAT. (Wolff, 1920) 1536.
4Constitutional objections to these statutes have been raised. Such
claims have been based upon their not being made expressly inapplicable
to concerns engaged in interstate commerce. But state tribunals by inter.
preting such laws as not applying to interstate commerce have avoided de-
claring them unconstitutional. See Humphrey v. City National Bank, 190
Ind. 293, 305, 130 N. E. 273, 277 (1921); cf. Western Silo Co. v. Johnson,
203 Ky. 704, 262 S. W. 1093 (1924); Talbot v. Smith, 211 Ky. 239, 277 S.
W. 257 (1925). The further possibility of a violation of the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment has also been raised. See Maurer v. Green-
ing Nursery Co., 199 Mich. 522, 525, 165 N. W. 861, 862 (1917).
: "No person, except as hereinafter provided, shall conduct or transact
business in this state under any assumed name, or under any designation
. .. other than the real name or names of the individuals conducting or
transacting such business, unless there has been filed in the office of the
town clerk in which such business is or is to be conducted or transacted, a
certificate stating the name under which such business is or is to be con-
ducted or transacted and the full name of every person conducting or trans-
acting such business, together with the post office address of each of said
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sons doing business under an assumed name cannot "commence
or maintain any action" prior to the filing of such certificate.0
In still other states, in addition to the penalties already noted
there are provisions that a failure to file the necessary papers
shall be prima facie evidence of fraud in securing credit, and
further, that in order to maintain suit, compliance with the stat-
ute must be alleged and proved by those transacting business
under an assumed name.
7
The penal effects of violating the acts regulating the use of
fictitious names appear fairly clear.8 But there are various
troublesome uncertainties in statutory interpretation revolving
about the question of the enforceability of contracts entered
into by enterprises conducting business in violation of the stat-
utes.9 The Supreme Court of Idaho recently had this latter prob-
persons.... Any person conducting or transacting business in violation
of the provisions of this section shall be fined Dot more than five hundred
dollars or imprisoned for not more than one year." CONN. GENr. STAT.
(1918) § 6505. Similar statutes are to be found in New York, Louisiana,
New Jersey, Michigan, Kansas, Indiana, North Carolina, Kentucf, Mis-
souri, Massachusetts and Texas.
-a"No person doing business under a fictitious name... shall maintain
any action upon or on account of any contract or contracts made, or trans-
action had under such fictitious name... in any court of this state until
the certificate has been filed and the publication has been made as herein
required." CAL. Crv. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 2468. See also OrLA. Cozp.
STAT. (1921) § 8143. Similar statutes are to be found in Ohio, Montana,
and Colorado. In some states, in addition to the penalty contained in the
California statute, failure to fie the required certificate constitutes a mis-
demeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. See 3 COLO. ANN. STAT.
(Courtaight, 1928) § 5367; PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §§ 15968, 15970, as
amended by Pi. STAT. (Supp. 1928) § 15968; 2 On. LAws (Olson, 1920)
§ 7781-82.
7 IWO person or persons carrying on, conducting, or transacting business
as aforesaid [under an assumed or fictitious name] ... shall be entitled to
maintain any suit in any of the courts of this state without alleging and
proving that such person or persons have filed a certificate as provided ...
and failure to file such certificate shall be prima facie evidence of fraud in
securing credit. Any person ... who shall fail to comply with the provi-
sions of this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall
be subject to a fine of not less than twenty five dollars nor more than two
hundred dollars." Idaho Laws 1921, c. 212, §§ 6, 7. Similar statutes are
to be found in Oregon and Washington.
8 The paucity of decided cases involving a criminal prosecution under an
assumed name statute would seem to indicate that such chargez are seldom
if ever pressed. Under the Connecticut statute, supra note 5, the local
prosecutors of New Haven and Middletown reported that during their
period of office (five and a half and nine years respectively) no criminal
prosecutions had been instituted. Only in Kentucky have decisions been
found in which the,state instituted the action. Commonwealth v. Sler,
176 Ky. 802, 197 S. W. 453 (1917) ; Commonwealth v. Richey, 171 Ky. 330,
188 S. W. 397 (1916).
9 The authorities are collected and the scope of the problem is outlined in
19301
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lem before it in Gallafent v. Tucker. 0 In this case the plaintiff
was doing business as the "Bannock Motor Company." He
brought an action against the defendant on an open account and
also to recover on a promissory note. The plaintiff had judgment
by default in the trial court, and on appeal the defendant con-
tended that the plaintiff had failed to allege and prove the proper
filing of a fictitious name certificate as required by the laws of
Idaho." The judgment was affirmed upon the ground that a fail-
ure to allege compliance with the statute constituted an affirma-
tive defense which the defendant had waived by its failure to
demur or answer in the trial court. The court also took the view
that non-compliance with the assumed name statute did not ren-
der the contracts of the offending business "void" nor give rise
to a "presumption of fraud in securing credit" 12 where credit
was obviously extended rather than received by the enterprisers.
Until very recently there was decided conflict on whether the
failure of a firm to comply withjthe statutes regulating the use
of fictitious names rendered contracts drawn under a fictitious
name unenforceable by those so failing to comply. 3 Courts which
Note (1926) 45 L. R. A. 198. The question is also discussed by Hildebrand,
The Massachusetts Trust (1924) 2 TEX. L. REV. 139, 180 et seq. See also
Note L. R. A. 1915D 988; (1927) 5 Tax. L. REV. 444; (1927) 16 KY. L.
J. 78; (1926) 14 Ky. L. J. 356; (1925) 4 Tax. L. REv. 250.
o 10281 Pac. 375 (Idaho 1929).
=i Supra note 7.
12 See text of Idaho statute quoted supra note 7.
13 In the following cases parties who had not complied with the statutory
requirement were not allowed recovery on their contracts because of such
non-compliance. Cashin v. Pliter, 168 Mich. 386, 134 N. W. 482 (1912);
Mauer v. Greening Nursery Co., 199 Mich. 522, 165 N. W. 861 (1917);
Hunter v. Big Four Auto Co., 162 Ky. 778, 173 S. W. 120 (1915) ; Warren
Oil and Gas Co. v. Gardner, 184 Ky. 411, 212 S. W. 456 (1919); Horning
v. McGill, 188 Ind. 332, 116 N. E. 303 (1917); Courtney v. Parker, 173 N.
C. 479, 92 S. E. 324 (1917).
Failure to comply with the statute was held not to bar recovery on a con-
tract in the following cases: Sagal v. Fylar, 89 Conn. 293, 93 Atl. 1027
(1915) ; Kusnetzky v. Security Ins. Co., 313 Mo. 143, 281 S. W. 47 (1926) ;
Bassen v. Monckton, 308 Mo. 641, 274 S. W. 404 (1925); Rutkowsky v.
Bozza, 77 N. J. L. 724, 73 Atl. 502 (1909) ; Viracola v. City of Long Branch,
142 Atl. 252 (N. J. 1923) ; Gay v. Siebold, 97 N. Y. 472 (1884) ; McArdle v.
Thames Iron Works, 96 App. Div. 139, 89 N. Y. Supp. 485 (3d Dep't 1904);
Uhlman v. Kin Daw, 97 Ore. 681, 193 Pac. 435 (1920) ; Huey v. Passarelli,
supra note 1; Toelke v. Toelke, 153 La. 697, 96 So. 536 (1923); Lamb v.
Condon, 276 Pa. 544, 120 Atl. 546 (1923); Whitton Oil and Gas Co. v.
Trapshooter Development Co., 291 S. W. 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Para-
gon Oil Syndicate v. Rhoades Drilling Co., 277 S. W. 1036 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1925). But there has apparently been some conflict in the decisions
within the same jurisdiction, as evidenced by the following cases which held
that such contracts were not enforceable at the instance of the firm vio-
lating the statute. O'Toole v. Garvin, 1 Hun. 92 (N. Y. 1874) ; Swords v.
Owen, 2 Jon. & S. 277 (N. Y. 1872).; Sykes v. Penna. R.R., 28 Pa. Dist.
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allow such enforcement of contracts by persons who have neg-
lected to file the, requisite certificates generally base their deci-
sion on rather vague notions of legislative intent."4 Various
clauses contained within the different statutes have been seized
upon as indicative of a legislative intention that such contracts
shall be "valid" and enforceable. 0 Thus a heavy criminal penalty
which should be adequate to compel compliance with the act
has been viewed as an indication that no other punishment was
intended."- And the very fact that such statutes do not expressly
declare invalid contracts made by non-complying parties has
been deemed to show an intent on the part of the legislature that
such agreements shall be enforceable." Some few courts go so
far as to state directly that the illegality of doing business in
contravention of a statute of this character ought not to be ex-
tended to make illegal ordinary contracts entered upon in the
usual course of business.s Such decisions fail to recognize that
R. 1037 (1919) ; Koons v. Nice, 30 Pa. Dist. R. 105 (1920) ; Moyer v. Ken-
nedy, 76 Pa. Super. Ct. 523 (1921); Loving v. Place, 266 S. W. 231 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924); Lipscomb & Co. v. Ordonez, 276 S. W. 955 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925).
14 See cases cited supro. note 13.
15This comment in discussing the enforceability of contract rights refers
only to enforceability at the instance of the firm which has failed to comply
with the statutes. The decisions are in complete agreement, even in those
states where the courts have sometimes refused to enforce the contract
rights of the offending firm, that a contract may be enforced against the
unregistered firm by the innocent party or parties to the agreement. See
Cashin v. Pliter, supra note 13, at 390, 134 N. W. at 483. And although
such contracts have been spoken of as "void," it would seem that they are
more properly only "voidable" at the election of the innocent party. Cf.
Humphry v. Nat'l Bank, 190 Ind. 293, 130 N. E. 273 (1921); Warren Oil
and Gas Co. v. Gardner, supra note 13; Kozy Theater Co. v. Love, 191 Ky.
595, 231 S. W. 249 (1921). But cf. Horning v. McGill, cupra note 13. A
more difficult question arises when the non-complying firm is sued and seehs
to set-off or counterclaim for an amount in excess of the plaintiff's claim.
Solomon v. Weiner, 188 Mich. 114, 153 N. W. 1058 (1915) (set-off refused
for all amounts in excess of plaintiff's claim).
16 Sagal v. Fylar, supra note 13; Hayes v. Providence Citizens' Bank &
Trust Co., 218 Ky. 128, 290 S. W. 1028 (1927).
17 Such a construction is most convincing where other statutes of the
same state do prescribe both a penalty for violation and that all contracts
made in contravention of the statute shall be null and void. Statements to
this effect are generally found in acts prohibiting the sale of liquor, gam-
bling, usury, combinations in restraint of trade, etc. See Hayes v. Provi-
dence Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., supra note 16, at 133, 290 S. W. at 1029;
Huey v. Passarelli, supra note 1, at 729.
'8 See Sagal v. Fylar, supra note 13, at 296, 93 At. at 1028. In Bassen
v. Monckton, supra note 13, at 650, 274 S. W. at 407, where recovery
was sought on an implied contract, the court said, "The plaintiffs in this
case had a natural and constitutional right to sell lumber and to transact
business .. . it is not contended that they violated any law in selling lum-
ber and materials and in performing work for defendants. The statute,
1930]
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the making of contracts is an essential part of the "doing of
business" and not a separate function. This objection, however,
is largely one of formal logic, for the assumed name statutes
do present an entirely different problem of enforcement from
that found in the sphere of gambling contracts, contracts for the
sale of liquor, or contracts in violation of the usury laws, where
the statutes are interpreted to prohibit any transactions of such
a character.19
Courts which have refused to enforce the contracts of unregis-
tered firms have -relied upon the rule of the common law,
announced by Chief Justice Holt 20 and recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Harris v. Runnes,21 as follows:
"Every contract made for or about any matter or thing which
is prohibited and made unlawful by any statute, is a void con-
tract, though the statute itself doth not mention that it shall be
so, but only inflicts a penalty on the offender, because a penalty
implies a prohibition, thq' there are no prohibitory words in the
statute." -
The courts of Michigan, Kentucky, Indiana, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Texas for a time purported to be following
this old common law rule in denying the enforceability of con-
tracts made by concerns which had not complied with an assumed
name statute. 2 In order to avoid the severity of this rule the
courts were quick to find that a particular name under which
the business was conducted was not "fictitious" or "assumed"
within the meaning of the statute.23 And within the past fifteen
years, the application of the old common law doctrine to statutes
regulating the use of assumed names has everywhere been virtu-
ally overruled by judicial decisions 24 or express legislative
under consideration [a fictitious name act] does not prohibit them from
engaging in the business they were engaged in .. . We hold that it is a
penal statute, and that it Aoes not restrict the rights of the plaintiffs to
contract and to recover for value rendered." Cf. Paragon Oil Syndicate v.
Rhoads Drilling Co., supra note 13.
19 See cases cited supra notes 17 and 18.
20 See Bartlett v. Vinor, Carth. 251, 252 (1693).
21 12 How. 79, 84 (U. S. 1851), in which the rule was accepted with the
limitation that only when the statute was silent, and contained nothing
from which a contrary intention could properly be inferred, was it necessary
that a contract in contravention of a statute be held void.
- See supra note 13 and cases cited.
23 Zemon v. Trim, 181 Mich. 130, 147 N. W. 540 (1914) (in an action for
the price of goods sold and delivered, "David S. Zemon & Co." held not to
be a fictitious name where the partners were David S. Zemon and Philip
D. Gordon); cf. Jennette v. Coppersmith, 176 N. C. 82, 97 S. E. 54 (1918).
But cf. Moyer v. Kenedy, supra note 13. See also (1927) 4 Tux. L. RBv. 445.
24 For example, the case of Hayes v. Providence Citizens' Bank & Trust
Co., supra note 16, specifically overruled Hunter v. Big Four Auto Co.,





The unmistakeable course of recent decisions passing upon the
applicability of assumed named statutes to civil actions has been
to narrow their operation as much as possible. Thus they have
been held not to affect the maintenance of a tort action -,' nor to
be applicable where, in addition to the assumed name, the proper
names of the parties conducting the business appeared in the
contract on which suit was brought.27 Furthermore, such statutes
denied recovery on contracts to non-complying enterprisers. This decision
was later confirmed by the case of Traut v. Carter, 218 Ky. 210, 291 S. W.
36 (1927). See a discussion of this holding in (1927) 16 KY. L. REV. 78.
Similarly in Indiana the case of Humphrey v. City National Bank, aupra
note 15, virtually overruled the earlier case of Homing v. McGill, -upra
note 13, which held that the agreements of persons violating the assumed
name laws were "void." And in Piggly-Wiggly v. Lowenstein, 197 Ind. 62,
147 N. E. 771 (1925), a contract action was permitted at the instance of a
firm which had apparently filed the required certificate after msing the
agreement upon which suit was grounded.
Early cases in New York raised some doubt as to the enforceability of
such contracts, but their enforceability has been clearly settled by the over-
whelming weight of modern authority. See supra note 13. The same i3
true of Texas where the question was definitely decided in Paragon Oil
Syndicate v. Rhoads Drilling Co., supra note 13.
- In Michigan, Act No. 263 of 1919 amended the former fictitious name
statute. The amendment specifically provided that failure to comply with
the statutory requirement of filing a certificate would not avoid contracts
but would prevent the party in default from maintaining an action thereon
until the certificate was filed. MiCH. CoLP. LAWS (Cahill Supp. 1922) §
6353. That this act definitely overruled Cashin v. Pliter and Mauer v.
Greening Nursery Co., both supra note 13, was decided in Johnson v.
Englebertson, 232 Mich. 518, 205 N. W. 604 (1925).
In 1919 the legislature of North Carolina amended the fictitious name
statute of that state by the addition of the words: "Provided, however,
that the failure of any person or persons ... to comply with provisions of
this article shall not prevent a recovery by said person or persons in any
of the courts of this state." CoDE OF N. C. (Michie, 1928) art. 3, §§ 3288-
91. This was interpreted by the state supreme court to overrule their de-
cision respecting the non-enforceability of such contracts as set out in
Courtney v. Parker, supra note 13.
Uncertainty over the enforceability of contract rights under the 1917
Pennsylvania assumed name statute EPA. STAT. (West, 1920) §§ 15968-
15971] apparently led the legislature to amend it in 1921 by providing that
non-resident firms might not institute a suit in the courts of the state until
they had paid the fine for neglecting to file the proper certificates.It Tna
held in Lamb v. Condon, supra note 13, that the omission of any such pro-
vision as to residents impliedly indicated an intent on the part of the legis-
lature in passing the act of 1917 that the contract rights of resident con-
gerns might be enforced even without their registration of a fictitious nme
Cf. the Pennsylvania cases cited supra note 13.
26Denton v. Booth, 202 Mich. 215, 168 N. W. 491 (1918); Barton v-
Thompson, 225 Mich. 40, 195 N. W. 682 (1925). For a collection of casea
see Note (1919) 2 L. R. A. 119.
2T Carland v. Heckler, 233 Fed. 504 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) ; Walker v. llwon,
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may not be invoked as a defense against a suit brought by an
assignee 28 or receiver 29 of a firm's claim nor in any action be-
tween partners inter se.30 Likewise it would seem that the fail-
ure to register an assumed name does not necessarily preclude a
suit for infringement of that name by another.
3 1
Even the severe penalty apparently imposed by fictitious-name
statutes which provide that no civil action may be maintained
without complying with the statute has been largely avoided in
practice through the use of various procedural devices. Thus the
failure of a plaintiff to comply with the statute only creates a
disability to maintain an action until compliance is had, and does
not render the contract permanently unenforceable82 And the
defendant can take advantage of this disability only by answer
or plea in abatement,33 or by demurrer 34 if the plaintiff's incapac-
ity to sue appears on the face of the complaint. He cannot raise
the question by a general denial . 3  If a defendant fails to plead
in abatement and answers to the merits, he is deemed to have
272 Pa. 315, 116 Atl. 305 (1922); Johnson v. Prineville, 100 Ore. 105, 196
Pac. 817 (1921); Loeb v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 78 App. Div. 113, 79 N. Y.
Supp. 510 (1st Dep't 1903); Hines v. Pictorial Review Co., 192 Mich. 256,
158 N. W. 894 (1916); Aromo v. Fire Ass'n of Phila., 218 Mich. 203, 187
N. W. 278 (1922); Falls v. Soles, 138 Wash. 407, 244 Pac. 707 (1926);
Rerick v. Ireland, 76 Ind. App. 139, 131 N. E. 527 (1921) ; Nolen v. Nelson,
310 Mo. 526, 275 S. W. 927 (1925). But see Mauer v. Greening Nursery Co.,
supra note 13, at 525, 165 N. W. at 862.
28 Cheney v. Newberry, 67 Cal. 126, 7 Pac. 445 (1885) (recovery allowed
even though it appeared assignment was for the purposq of evading the
statute); Standard Sewing Machine Co. v. New State Shirt & Overall Mfg.
Co., 42 Okla. 554, 141 Pac. 1111 (1914). Contra: Warren Oil & Gas Co. v.
Gardner, supra note 13 (assignee of violator of statute stands in no better
position than assignor); Choctaw Lumber Co. v. Gilmore, 11 Okla. 462, 68
Pac. 733 (1902). But cf. Creditors Adjustment Co. v. Rossi, 26 Cal. App.
725, 148 Pac. 528 (1915) (statutory provision as to assignee's rights).
29 Tripp v. Deupree, 60 Okla. 47, 158 Pac. 923 (1916).
30 Price v. Edwards, 178 N. C. 493, 101 S. E. 33 (1919); cf. Barton v.
Thompson, 225 Mich. 40, 195 N. W. 682 (1923).
31 Potter v. Osgood, 79 Pa. Super. Ct. 397 (1922) (failure to register
name used for several years held not to preclude suit to enjoin use of same
name by another who had registered it); Delin v. Peek, 135 Fed. 167 (S. D.
N. Y. 1904), aff'd, 144 Fed. 1021 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Wallach Bros. v.
Wallack, 200 App. Div. 169, 192 N. Y. Supp. 723 (1st Dep't 1922).
32 Uhlman v. Kin Daw, supra note 13; Canonica v. St. George, 64 Mont.
200, 208 Pac. 607 (1922); Sutton v. Coast Trading Co., 49 Wash. 694, 96
Pac. 428 (1908).
33 See Holden v. Mensinger, 175 Cal. 300, 303, 165 Pac. 950, 951 (1917);
Bryant v. Wellbanks, 88 Cal. App. 144, 152, 263 Pac. 332, 336 (1928); Note
(1926) 45 A. L. R. 198, 270 and cases cited.
3, See Slaten v. No. 8 Thresher Co., 136 Okla. 298, 299, 277 Pac. 658, 659
(1928).
- as Bryant v. Wellbanks, supra note 33; Note (1926) 45 A. L. R. 198, 270.
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waived the defense.2 In the absence of specific statutory require-
ment,3 7 the plaintiff need not allege and prove compliance with
the statute 3 and the burden of proving non-compliance rests
with the defendant.39 In most jurisdictions, violation of the sta-
tute may be remedied by filing the proper certificate any time
before the trial,'4  or possibly even after the trial has com-
menced.4 '
The Idaho statute expressly requires that compliance with the
fictitious name regulations be alleged and proved in any civil
action brought by a person or persons conducting business under
such an assumed designation.4 2 Even under such a statute, it
was held in Gafhafent v. Tucker 43 that non-compliance with this
act constituted only an affrmative defense which was waived if
not raised by the defendant in the trial court. Thus the decision
extends still further the modern tendency of courts to refuse to
allow a failure to comply with a fictitious name statute to defeat
the enforcement of an ordinary business contract.
The justification for this narrow interpretation 41 of assumed
36 Uhlman v. Kin Daw, supra note 13; cf. Beamish v. Noon, 76 Ore. 415,
149 Pac. 522 (1915).
37 The laws of Idaho and Oregon specifically require a party doing busi-
ness under an assumed name to allege and prove compliance with the stat-
ute when bringing any action. 2 ORE. LAWs (Olson, 1920) § 7781; Idaho
Laws 1921, c. 212, § 6. The same is true of Washington.
38 Holden v. Mensinger, supra, note 33. In the absence of proof by the
defendant to the contrary, it is presumed that the plaintiff complied with
the statute. See Davis v. Rothenberg, 124 Okla. 74, 75, 254 Pac. 37, 38
(1926); cf. Hill v. Paige Motor Co., 123 Okla. 254, 253 Pac. 97 (1926).
- Hill v. Paige Motor Co., supra note 38; Slatin v. No. 8 Thresher Co,
suprq note 34.
o Rudneck v. So. California Metal Co., 184 Cal. 274, 193 Pac. 775 (1920);
Reilly v. Hatheway, 46 Mont. 1, 125 Pac. 417 (1912) ; see Uhlman v. Kin
Daw, supra note 13, at 695, 193 Pac. at 439, and cases there cited; cf.
Bryant v. Wellbanks, supra note 33. But ef. Drake v. Great Northern Ry.,
24 S. D. 19, 123 N. W. 82 (1909). In some states the statutes are so
phrased that it appears obvious that this result was intended. See COL.
Cirv. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 2468; Micii. Cozap. LAws (Cahill Supp. 1922)
§ 6353 (5). In Oklahoma the act specifically provides that compliance after
the transaction removes the disability to sue. OSLA. COUP. STAr. (1921)
§ 8143; cf. Bleecker v. Miller, 40 Okla. 374, 138 Pac. 809 (1914) ; Bolene Ref.
Co. v. Zobisch Oil Co., 98 Okla. 202, 224 Pac. 942 (1923).
41 Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Hulvershorn, 31 Ohi C. C. 444 (1909) cern-
ble (filing certificate even after statute of limitations had run apparently
held sufficient to perfect an action commenced before the expiration of the
limitation period).
- Supra note 7.
43 Supra note 10, at 377.
44Some courts have justified a strict interpretation of fictitious name
statutes by pointing out that such statutes are in derogation of the com-
mon law freedom of contract. See Uhlman v. Kin Daw, cupra note 13, at
692, 193 Pac. at 438; Sutton v. Coast Trading Co., supra note 32, at 699,
96 Pac. at 430.
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name statutes is to be found in the purpose thought to be served
by such laws. Their frequently stated object is to enable the
public, and more particularly creditors or potential creditors of a
firm, to ascertain the identity of persons responsible for the
management and obligations of the business.45 Accordingly, un-
less it be deemed necessary for its prophylactic effect 40 to impose
a more severe penalty than those expressly provided by the
statutes themselves, there appears to be no reason for permitting
a failure to file the required certificates to defeat a recovery by
a firm on its contract where credit has been extended by the en-
terprisers rather than received from some member of the general
public. 47 Similarly, even where credit has been received by the
firm, or the contract is purely executory, if no actual reliance
fias been placed in the assumed name nor damage induced thereby,
it seems to go beyond the particular aims of the statutes to
declare agreements made by a non-complying firm unenforce-
able.48
Decisions rendering unenforceable the contracts of unlicensed
physicians, apothecaries, architects, and the like are hardly in
point since the obvious purpose of such license laws is to insure
that only competent persons engage in such professions. 4 There
is likewise a different objective behind statutes penalizing the
parties to gambling contracts, agreements in restraint of trade,
and usurious contracts."0 The type of statute under considera-
45 See Gay v. Seibold, supra note 13, at 476; Price v. Edwards, 178 N. C.
493, 496, 101 S. E. 33, 34 (1919); Andrews v. Glick, 272 Pac. 587, 588
(Cal. 1928); Sagal v. Fylar, supra note 13, at 297, 93 Atl. at 1028; Uhl-
man v. Kin Daw, supra note 13, at 694, 193 Pac. at 438.
46 In Connecticut, the local prosecutors of New Haven and Middletown
regard the statutory penalty of a year in jail or five hundred dollars fine
as more than sufficient to insure the registration of fictitious names. Tho
city attorney of New Haven pointed out that the managers of small busi-
ness units were often unfamiliar with the law and that the threat of fine
or imprisonment invariably secured immediate compliance with the statute.
',Rutkowsky v. Bozza; Sagal v. Fylar; Uhlman v. Kin Daw, all supra
note 13; Ditzell v. Shoecraft, 274 S. W. 880 (Mo. 1925); Doyle v. Shuttle-
worth, 41 Misc. 42, 83 N. Y. Supp! 609 (Sup. Ct. 1903). Such decisions
have been predicated upon grounds of estoppel. Nolen v. Nelson, 310 Mo.
526, 275 S. W. 927 (1925); Kusnetzky v. Security Ins. Co., supra note 13.
Also compare the situation to that of corporations by estoppel. Note (1922)
7 MINN. L. Rv. 42.
48 Walker v. Mason, supra note 27; Lamb v. Condon; MeArdle v. Thames
Iron Work, both supra note 13; Dutherage & Hall v. Johnson, 270 Fed. 777
(C. C. A. 5th, 1921). Contra: Cashin v. Pliter; Mauer v. Greening Nurs-
ery Co., both supra note 13. The fact that the creditor was amply protected
by a lien for freight charges was considered of importance in Wood v. Erie
R.R., 72 N. Y. 196 (1878).
49 Doyle v. Shuttleworth, supra note 47; Kusnetsky v. Security Ins. Co.,
supra note 13 and cases cited.
- Supra note 19. But cf. Cashin v. Pliter; Mauer v. Greening Nursery
Co., both supra note 13.
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ion in the principal case appears more nearly analogous to those
statutes which require the filing of a certificate by a foreign cor-
poration as a condition precedent to doing business within a state.
Contracts entered into by corporations violating this regulation
are frequently held enforceable.51 The analogy is particularly per-
suasive when the similarity in purpose of the respective laws is
taken into consideration. Thus the filing of an assumed name
informs the public as to the proper palties to an action brought
against the firm 52 and the filing of a certificate by a foreign cor-
poration provides for the designation of someone within the
jurisdiction upon whom process may be served."3
Unquestionably the general purpose of the many assumed name
acts has been the prevention of fraud. That such regulations
might themselves become the means of effecting fraud upon non-
complying enterprisers was clearly not contemplated by the vari-
ous legislatures. In this connection the Supreme Court of Missouri
in Kusnetzky v. Security Insurance Co." said:
"One could buy on credit a car from the Capital Motor Com-
pany; he could get his gasoline and have his car repaired at the
Efficiency Garage; he could get groceries at the Delmonico, his
ice cream at the Purity Ice Cream Company, his clothing at the
Golden Eagle Clothiers, his milk from the Model Dairy, his bread
at the Home Bakery; and, after having worn out and eaten all
the stuff thus acquired, without paying for it, he could defeat
all suits brought to recover pay (ment) because those names had
never been registered."
And the Supreme Court of Kentucky in reversing its former de-
cisions which held such contracts unenforceable, declared:
"In the Hunter case we said, 'It is probable that a rule like
this may, in some instances, work a hardship by permitting one
person to get the benefit of another person's labor, service or
property without compensation.' Experience has demonstrated
that this is about all the rule has done and we have therefore
determined to reexamine the question to see if the correct result
was arrived at in those cases.55
In actual practice the filed certificates of those transacting busi-
5 See Model Heating Co. v. Magarity, 25 Del. 459, 81 Atl. 394 (1911),
and extensive collection of cases there cited; (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 904.
Also cf. Uhlman v. Kin Daw; Sagal v. Fylar, both supra note 13.
Humphrey v. City National Bank; Warren Oil & Gas Co. v. Gardner,
both supra note 13; Acme Drilling Co. v. Gorman Oil Syndicate, 198 Ky.
576, 249 S. W. 1003 (1923).
53 See cases cited supra note 51.
54 Supra note 13, at 155, 281 S. W. at 50.
55 Supra note 16, at 131, 290 S. W. at 1029. See also dissenting opinion
in Mauer v. Greening Nursery Co., supra note 13. The rule declaring such
contracts unenforceable -as a particularly harsh one, since an offending
firm could not even recover for goods actually sold and delivered by suing




ness under an assumed name are probably seldom examined by
creditors and only occasionally by those seeking to avoid dupli-
cation of a trade name.56 Also under modern business conditions
the wide use of credit rating systems and the maintenance of
credit departments by all large concerns make less and less likely
actual reliance upon the filed certificates by prospective creditors.
COMPULSORY COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE SHERMAN ACT
Commercial arbitration as a means of settling disputes which
arise within an industry has been recognized as of great value.
Of recent years national trade associations have adopted it as a
trade practice and have set up the necessary machinery.1  As
sponsored by the associations it is still in an experimental stage,
and the trade associations are busy familiarizing their members
with the practical advantages to be derived from it. 2 For the
most part submission to arbitration is voluntary; but some asso-
ciations have made it compulsory. Various devices of compulsion
have been adopted; and the penalties for failure to arbitrate fall
both upon members of an association and upon non-members do-
ing business with a member.
3
The mere adoption of commercial arbitration does not contra-
vene any law; 4 but the collective agreement to compel arbitra-
tion may run afoul of anti-trust legislation.5 The Federal Trade
Commission, however, in line with its policy of eliminating un-
fair competitive conditions by means of collective agreements,
has encouraged the adoption of arbitration.6 Although agree-
56 The town clerks of Middletown and New Haven with whom certificates
must be filed under the Connecticut statute are the source of this statement.
1 See JONES, TRADE ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES AND THE LAW (1922) 193.
2 For a record of the trade association activity in arbitration, see YEAR
BOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (American Arbitration Association
1927); WARFORD AND MAY, TRADE ASSOCIATION AcTiviTiss (1923).
3 Arbitration is made compulsory by by-laws or by a future disputes
clause in a uniform contract. Penalties imposed are usually suspension,
expulsion, fine, publication in trade magazines, collective refusal to arbi-
trate in the future with one refusing to arbitrate with any member, and col-
lective pressure affecting credit. Cf. various association by-laws collected in
YEAR BOOK ON CoMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1927).
4 Oliphant, Trade Associations and the Law (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 381,
383; JONES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 211.
5 Section one of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1926).
6 At trade conferences called by the Federal Trade Commission objection-
able prevalent practices are changed by general agreement. See HENDER-
SON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924) 78 et seq.; FEDERAL TRADE
COMiSSiON, TRADE PRACTICE SUBMITrALS (1925). At one of these con-
ferences the uniform exhibition contract providing for compulsory arbiltra-
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ments between competitors not to trade except upon conditions
compelling arbitration are in fact restraints upon trade, they
have been countenanced by the Commission apparently on the
ground that they are not unreasonable and illegal restraints upon
interstate commerce within the scope of the Sherman Act. When
the agreements compel arbitration between the parties to the
agreement, comparatively simple problems are raised. The diffi-
culty in avoiding the Sherman Act is greater in attempting to
force outside parties to arbitrate.
The most drastic attempt has been that tried by the organ-
ized distributors in the moving picture industry. These distrib-
utors resorted to an agreement to control credit. A uniform
exhibition contract 8 was adopted providing that all disputes
thereunder must be submitted to arbitration; that the arbitra-
tors' award should be final; and that if an exhibitor should fail
to submit his case or refuse to comply with the award, all dis-
tributors having contracts with him were required to demand
a cash deposit as security on each contract and to suspend serv-
ice should the exhibitor default. Although approved by the
Federal Trade Commission," the distributors, and some ex-
hibitors,10 the agreement to enforce arbitration was enjoined in
United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp.,'" a suit
brought by the Department of Justice.
tion was adopted and approved, FEDERAL TRADE Com quSSxON, TRADE
PRAGTIfCE CONFERENCES (1928).
7,,The legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by
so simple a test as whether it restrains c6mrptition." Chicago Board
of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238, 38 Sup. Ct. 242, 244 (1918).
The "rule of reason" laid down in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1911) and, United States v. American To-
bacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1911), is applied to determine
whether the restraint imposed by trade association activity is such as may
suppress competition. Cement Mfrs. Protection Ass'n v. United States,
268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586 (1925); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n. v.
United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 Sup. Ct. 578 (1925).
8 There are upwards of 25,000 theaters in the United States, most of
them independently owned. Between twenty to sixty contracts a year are
made to supply each with pictures. It is estimated that over 1,000,000
contracts a year are involved. Cf. United States v. Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp., 34 F. (2d) 984 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); United States v. First
National Pictures, 34 F. (2d) 815 (S. D. N. Y. 1929); YEAR BOOK 01
Co umcrAL RmLATIONS (1927) 606.
9 See supra note 6.
10 At the conference adopting the uniform exhibition contract only such
organizations of exhibitors as exist and such independent exhibitors as
could be gathered were represented.
- Supra note 8. It was held that since the agreement had been imposed
upon the exhibitors against their wishes, the agreement was an illegal
restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. 26 STAT. 209 (1890),
15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 4 (1926). But it will be noted that agreements which
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The control of credit has been utilized by trade associations
to regulate some trade practices without being held illegal as
an unreasonable restraint of trade. Credit bureaus are main-
tained and information concerning the financial status of cus-
tomers and their reliability is freely exchanged. 12 If an individ-
ual member reports a delinquent creditor and the claim is not
disputed the members of the trade association can collectively
refuse to extend further credit and can insist upon cash on or
before delivery.13 And in United States v. First National Pic-
tures, 4 the "companion suit" to the Paramount case, the device
of compelling the exhibitor to put up a deposit as security under
stated conditions was used not merely to protect credit relations
but to eradicate the allegedly widespread trade abuse of color-
able sales of theatres to avoid contracts. The distributors were
required to insist upon the burdensome cash deposit in contract-
ing with a purchaser of a theater unless the purchaser assumed
existing contracts made by the vendor with any member of the
distributors' organization. The court held that restraint valid
because it discouraged fraudulent transfers of theatres designed
to avoid performances of contracts made by the vendors with
distributors.
Arbitration, of course, was not intended to eradicate a fraud,
but was adopted to take care of another wide spread evil, the
mass of petty but costly litigation resulting from contracts for
the sale of a partially standardized commodity.21 The agree-
ment to enforce the uniform exhibition contract was designed
to make a positive improvement in the industry and not merely
to negative a fraudulent practice. But the court did not find this
sufficient to justify a coercive method of supplanting judicial
examination of a dispute."
have been held valid have been made without the assent of outside parties
whom they affect. See infr notes 12, 13, 14.
12 Cement Mfrs. Protection Ass'n v. United States; Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States, both supra note 7; United States v. So. Cal. Whole-
sale Grocers, 7 F. (2d) 944 (S. D. Cal. 1925). But cf. American Column
and Lumber- v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup. Ct. 114 (1921);
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, 43 Sup. Ct. 607
(1923).
1i United States v. Fur Dressers' and Fur Dyers' Ass'n, 5 F. (2d) 869
(S. D. N. Y. 1925).
14 Supra note 8. In that case there was evidence both of colorable sales
to avoid contracts, and of great loss to the distributors from unfulfilled
contracts.
15 Many points of a movie contract are necessarily ambiguous. Dis-
putes arise over play-dates, amount of protection against second runs,
rentals, advertising, and even whether the picture made and delivered ful-
fills the specifications of the picture contracted for. See BLooMFmL, Coi-
MEaCIAL ARBIRATION (1927) 58; cf. JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 196.
1 Cf. (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 666.
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If the "fraudulent and irregular trade practices" on the part
of the exhibitors justified the agreement of the distributors in
demanding security in the First National case, an examination
of the practice of the distributors themselves may explain why
the court -was inclined to find a similar demand illegal when
used to compel arbitration. It has been the constant complaint
of the exhibitors that the arbitration tribunals have not been
impartial, 7 but have been controlled by the distributors, and
that the exhibitor arbitrators have been dominated by the dis-
tributors. 8 Since an exhibitor is compelled to submit his busi-
ness disputes for final determination to a private tribunal whose
impartiality is in doubt and whose decisions have been a constant
source of complaint, the reasonableness and justice of the court's
decision is patent even though it was rested on the questionable
ground that there was no assent to the arbitration agreement by
some exhibitors.
Doubtless other methods employed to compel arbitration will be
carefully scrutinized in the light of this decision. How can a trade
association make arbitration compulsory and still not violate
the Shermau Act? Will an agreement by members of a trade
association to refuse to arbitrate any future disputes with a
party who refuses to arbitrate a case with a member be consid-
ered an illegal restraint of trade? I The question is of little
practical importance at present, perhaps, for the right to a jury
trial is more greatly valued and jealously guarded than arbitra-
tion.z2 and hence the taking away of the opportunity to arbitrate
future disputes may not be regarded by third parties and by the
courts as a serious deprivation. But if it should appear that
arbitration is a method of settling trade disputes superior to
court litigation, the issue might well arise as a corollary to the
Paramount case.
Would the publishing in trade magazines of the names of those
17 The arbitration boards were set up in the centers of distribution by
the Film Boards of Trade, the local distributor organizations. Three ar-
bitrators were to. be selected by the Film Board of Trade, and three by
the exhibitors, a seventh to be chosen if necessary. The exhibitor's rep-
resentatives were to be selected by the local exhibitor organization if such
existed; If no such organization existed, the arbitrators were to be selected,
at the request of the Film Board of Trade, by the Chamber of Com-
merce of the distribution center or by the Mayor.
IsIt has been charged that impartial arbitration does not exist becauze
of the distributors' control of the arbitration machinery, the ignorance of
exhibitors of arbitration procedure, and the desire of hard pressed ex-
hibitors to "stand in" with the distributors at the expense of other
exhibitors. See the files of Harrison's Reports and of the Moving Picture
World and Herald.
19 Cf. By-Law XVII, § 3, of the National-Amercan Lumber Ass'n., re-
printed in YEAs Boox oN Co emi ciAL ARBmATioN (1927) 655.
2oSee ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1924) 303.
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who refuse to arbitrate or comply with an arbitration award be
enjoined? The exchange of lists of delinquent debtors and the
pooling of other trade information have been held to be a legi-
timate function of a trade association.21 On the other hand, cir-
culation of information in the form of "black lists" with an
agreement between the members of a trade association to refrain
from dealing with those interdicted has been held to be in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.2 2 If it should appear that the coercive
effect of publication is more than any moral stigma which may
attach to one who refuses to arbitrate, to what analogy will the
case be assimilated? Much will depend upon the concomitant
practices of the association, the manner in which the issues are
first presented to the courts, and how the courts resolve the con-
flict between the policy of encouraging collective agreements on
the one hand, and the insistence on free competition on the other.
It is generally assumed that compulsory arbitration between
members of an association is not subject to attack as a restraint
of trade.2 3 The by-laws of the association may provide for com-
pulsory arbitration; a member must arbitrate or be expelled or
suspended. 24 But it is the object of trade associations to make
membership so attractive as to make it unprofitable to risk ex-
pulsion. The functions they perform are so valuable, their ac-
tivities are so widespread, that it may become indispensable to
21 Cement Mfrs. Protection Ass'n v. United States; Maple Flooring Mfrs.
Ass'n v. United States, both supra note 7; United States v. So. Col. Whole-
sale Grocers, supra note 12.
But note that "the evidence falls short of establishing any understand-
ing on the basis of which credit was to be extended to customers or that
any cooperation resulted from the distribution of this information, or that
there were any consequences from it other than such as would naturally
ensue from the exercise of the individual judgment of manufacturers in
determining, on the basis of available information, whether to extend credit
or to require cash or security from any given customer." Cement Mfgs. Pro-
tection Ass'n v. United States, supra note 7, at 600, 45 Sup. Ct. at 590; of.
United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392, 400, 47 Sup. Ct, 377,
380 (1927).
22 Eastern States Retail Lumber v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 34
Sup. Ct. 951 (1914); cf. Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range, 221 U. S.
418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492 (1911); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct.
170 (1915).
23 United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., supra note 8, at
988; KRis, TRAD AssocIATIoNs: THE LEGAL ASPECTS (1928) 230; JONES,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 199.
24 Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 19 Sup. Cit. 50 (1898);
Gerseta Corp. v. Silk Ass'n, 200 App. Div. 890, 192 N. Y. Supp. 370 (1st
Dep't 1922); National League v. Hornung, 148 App. Div. 355, .132
N. Y. Supp. 871 (4th Dep't 1911); cf. Greene v. Board of Trade, 174 Ill.
585, 51 N. E. 599 (1898); Board of Trade v. Nelson, 162 Ill. 431, 44 N.
E. 743 (1896); Evans v. Chamber of Commerce, 86 Minn. 448, 91 N. W.
8 (1902) ; Moyse v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange, 143 App. Div. 265, 128 N. Y.
Supp. 112 (1st Dep't 1911).
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belong to one. What then, if compulsory arbitration is made a
feature of membership? In the Paramount case it was recog-
nized "that the restraint imposed upon the exhibitors is [not]
voluntary because they accept and agree to be bound by the
contracts. They can have none other, because the defendants
have agreed that they shall not." 23 Finding it essential to hold
membership, can it be said that a member of a trade association
consents to the arbitration provided for in the by-laws? Then
should the trade association be prevented from compelling its
members to submit to arbitration?
The solution envisaged by the court in the Paranoitut case is
arbitration "voluntarily adopted by the members of this indus-
try, without coercion or other unlawful restraint." But while
it may be that "the most lasting benefits are likely to flow from
educational methods which impress upon the participants in the
trade a vivid realization of the burdens and frequent futility
of litigation, and of the simplicity and ultimate advantage of
arbitration as an alternative process of settling commercial dis-
putes," 2G it must be expected that trade associations will resort
to coercive methods to maintain a uniformity of practice. If a
system of arbitration which is clearly impartial and of benefit to
the entire industry sliould be made compulsory, it is doubtful
whether the courts would find it an unreasonable restraint of
trade because of the compulsory features. The problem, after
all, is that of securing an impartial settlement of disputes. If
arbitration is rejected, the disputants are compelled to accept
the ordeal of the courts.
JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS BROUGHT INTO A STATE
BY FORCE OR FRAUD
Before considering how far jurisdiction in parsona= is affected
by the fact of force or fraud in bringing a defendant into the
state-questions which have received comparatively scant atten-
tion from courts and commentatos-something of a foundation
may be laid by reviewing briefly the theories which have emerged
from certain modern and more frequently discussed developments
within the general field of personal jurisdiction. It is in the case
where the defendant is outside the territory of the state that new
jurisdictional devices have most strikingly asserted themselves
and in consequence it is there that one may look for some of the
considerations which are conceded to sanction jurisdiction over
the person.
25Supra note 8, at 989.
26 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERNCE BOARD, Taius ASSOCIATIONS: T-m
ECoNOMIC SIGNIFICANCE AND LEGAL STATUS (1925) 2S7.
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In certain instances domicil within the state,1 and perhaps al-
legiance owed the state,2 have been regarded as affording a suf-
ficient basis for jurisdiction in personam over persons not actu-
ally within the state. Further it is familiar law that where a
court properly has jurisdiction over the person at the commence-
ment of a suit, such jurisdiction continues until the proceeding
is brought to a final termination, even though the defendant has
left the state.3 But this rule is not extended to later develop-
ments of the suit which could not have been contemplated by the
1 Northern Aluminum Co., Ltd. v. Law, 147 Atl. 715 (Md. 1929); of. Mc-
Donald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343 (1917), L. R. A. 1917F 458
(where the court raised the question, but refused to pass upon it, inas-
much as the method of service was held to be a violation of due process of
law); Bryant v. Shute's Ex'r, 147 Ky. 268, 144 S. W. 28 (1912) (allowed
suit upon a judgment obtained in Massachusetts, where the defendant was
domiciled, service of process having been made at her last place of abode
in accordance with a Massachusetts statute; the court assumed that she was
out of the state at the time). In the latter case the court speaks of "resi-
dence," but it may be assumed that it meant "domicil," since the facts
seemed sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was actually
domiciled there.
An argument has been made that it would be very inconvenient if this
were not the law, since an individual may be concealing himself or be absent
in parts unknown, and hence subject to suit nowhere; but since every per-
son has a domicil, whose law governs him in a number of particulars, such
as personal "status," responsibility for taxes, and devolution of his prop-
erty, there is a good basis for saying that he is subject to suit there. GOOD-
ncH, CONFLICT OF LAws (1927). 137; Note (1911) 11 COL. L. REV. 352;
Comment (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 492.
2 Allegiance as a basis for jurisdiction would seem impractical when ap-
plied to a state of the United States. Further, it has been said that there
is no citizenship of a state, as distinguished from United States citizenship,
by a person not domiciled in the state. Cf. Hammerstein v. Lyne, 200 Fed.
165 (W. D. Mo. 1912). The question is important, however, in determining
whether rights created by a foreign judgment are entitled to recognition by
a state. In support of allegiance as a basis for jurisdiction, of. Ouseley v.
Lehigh Valley Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 84 Fed. 602 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1897);
Douglas v. Forrest, 4 Bing. 686 (1828). Against the proposition, of. Grubel
v. Nassauer, 210 N. Y. 149, 103 N: E. 1113 (1913), 52 L. R. A. (N. 9.) 161
(1914), noted in (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 464; and Smith v. Grady, 68 Wis.
215, 31 N. W. 477 (1887). A recent case, however, upheld the constitution-
ality of a federal statute providing that a citizen of the United States may
be ordered to return from abroad to appear as a witness in a criminal action
in the United States courts if his attendance is desired by the prosecuting
officials. The defendant appeared specially through his attorneys and
moved to vacate an order to show cause why he should not be adjudged
guilty of contempt on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over
him, but his motion was overruled. United States v. Blaclmer, reported in
U. S. Daily, March 24, 1928, at 196 (Sup. Ct. D. C.), and noted in (1928)
41 HARv. L. REV. 1067.
3See opinion of Holmes, J., in Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S..
346, 353, 33 Sup. Ct. 550, 552 (1913).
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defendant 4 A basis frequently advanced for jurisdiction over a
person not physically present within the territorial limits of the
state is "consent." - But it seems clear that such "consent" is
often merely a fiction,0 the real basis for jurisdiction lying in cer-
tain other considerations. Thus Hand, J., speaking of a statutory
rule that a foreign corporation would be deemed to have con-
sented to the appointment of an agent to accept service, said:
"The Court does not mean that as a fact it has consented at all
.... The Court, in the interests of justice, imputes results to the
voluntary act of doing business within the foreign state, quite
independently of any intent." 1
4A judgment rendered upon the question presented by such later develop-
ment was held to have been given without jurisdiction and not entitled to
recognition in another state. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S.
518, 36 Sup. Ct. 613 (1916).
5 National Coal Co. v. Cincinnati Gas Coke, Coal & Mining Co., 168 Mich.
195, 131 N. W. 580 (1911) (consent by entering a general appearance after
an action had been started); Houston v. Ormes, 252 U. S. 469, 40 Sup. CL
369 (1920) (consent by raising questions going to the merits of the action) ;
Hazel v. Jacobs, 78 N. 3. L. 459, 75 AtL 903, 27 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1066 (1910),
20 Ann. Cas. 260 (1911) (consent in advance through execution of power
of attorney to confess judgment); of. Copin v. Adamson, L. R. 9 Ex. 345
(1874) (consent by purchase of shares in a company to be bound by its by-
laws as to service of process).
f This is strikingly brought out in the case of York v. Texas, 137 U. S.
15 (1890), where it was held that there was no violation of the "duo
process" clause by a Texas statute -which provided that a defendant submits
himself wholly to the jurisdiction of a court of that state if ho askm the
court to determine any question, even that of service of process outside the
state. Also see infra note 7.
* SmolUk v. Philadelphia etc. Co., 222 Fed. 148, 151 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
Three theoretical bases for upholding a court's jurisdiction over the corpo-
ration have been advanced: (a) that the corporation, by doing businems
within the state, has given an "implied" consent to be bound by the state's
statutes upon the method for service of process; (b) that the corporation
is present and is found within the state; and (c) that on principles of
justice, if a corporation voluntarily does business within the state, it is
bound by reasonable regulations of that business by the state. Cf. BIAL-,
FOREIGN CoRPORATIoNs (1904) §§ 262, 263, 264. But a foreign corporation
doing interstate business can not be prevented from carrying on such busi-
ness within the state. Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telo-
graph Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1877). Yet such a corporation, which did not con-
sent and did not wish to submit itself to the state's jurisdiction, has been
held bound by service of process upon an agent to receive summons, ap-
pointed by a statute of the state in which it was doing business. Interna
tional Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 947 (1914).
Also, a refusal to consent will not defeat a court's jurisdiction in this situ-
ation. Cf. Smolik v. Philadelphia etc. Co., supra. It is apparent that "con-
sent" is a fiction, and not a reason for upholding jurisdiction. Cf. Cahill,
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corwations (1917) 30 HAn. L. REv. 676; HEN-
DERSON, THE POSTION OF FOREIGN CoRPonATIoNS IN A CAN Ci CON.si u-
TioAL LAW (1918) c. 5; Fead, Jurisdiction Over For'ign Cropvrat -
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The inadequacy of the "consent" theory seems apparent also in
(1926) 24 MICH. L. REv. 633; Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing
Business Within a State (1919) 32 HAv. L. Rm. 871.
An argument against the proposition that a foreign corporation is "pres-
ent" within the state would seem to lie in the fact that jurisdiction is only
upheld as to causes of action arising within the state where service is ob-
tained through a statute appointing a public official to receive it, even though
the action be transitory in nature. Cf. Old Wayne Mutual Life Association
v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236 (1907); Simon v. Southern Ry.
Co., 236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255 (1915). But cf. Smolik v. Philadelphia
etc. Co., supra, where statutory service upon a public official was regarded as
conferring jurisdiction over a foreign corporation doing business within the
state, though the cause of action arose outside the state. It should be noted
that the Smolik case involved no question of recognition of rights created
by a judgment of another state, whereas the Old Wayne case and the Simon
case squarely presented this question for determination, and are direct
holdings on the point of jurisdiction in the conflict of laws sense. The best
explanation for upholding jurisdiction in these cases would seem to be that
a state should be able to place reasonable regulations upon a foreign corpo-
ration voluntarily within the state in order properly to protect its citizens;
and jurisdiction of the state's courts over causes of action arising in the
state should therefore be upheld in order to accomplish this protection. Cf.
Scott, op. cit. supra at 882.
Whether or not such jurisdiction can be extended to cover nonresident in-
dividuals who are doing business within the state does not seem to be settled.
Cf. Brooks v. Dun, 51 Fed. 138 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1892); Caldwell v.
Armour & Co., 1 Pennew. 545, 43 Atl. 517 (Del. 1899) ; Cabanne v. Graf, 87
Minn. 510, 92 N. W. 461 (1902). These cases indicate that jurisdiction
could not be so extended; but they are unsatisfactory inasmuch as the ques-
tion of jurisdiction in the conflict of laws sense was not involved, and also
other factors were present to weaken the cases. As to partnerships, the ques-
tion Was presented to the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97 (1919), where a Kentucky
statute provided for service of process upon an agent of nonresidents who
were doing business in that state. The Kentucky court had rendered a
judgment against the nonresidents through such service, and a suit was
brought in Illinois upon it. The Supreme Court of Illinois refused to recog-
nize the judgment, and this decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of
the United States. The analogy to suits against foreign corporations was
invoked, but Holmes, J., in rendering the opinion of the Court, said: "But
the consent that is said to be implied in such cases is a mere fiction, founded
upon the accepted doctrine that the States could exclude foreign corpora-
tions altogether, and therefore could establish this obligation as a condition
to letting them in." It has been seen that this argument will not apply
where the business is of an interstate nature, and yet jurisdiction is upheld
over such foreign corporations. Also, a state may discriminate between
residents and non-residents. Cf. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241 (1907);
Douglas v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R.R., 279 U. S. 377, 49 Sup. Ct. 355 (1929) ;
Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 388. There would seem to be no violation
of the "privileges and immunities" clause. And the "due process" clause
should be satisfied by the giving of the best notice possible under the cir-
cumstances. Cf. McDonald v. Mabee, supra note 1. If these constitutional
requirements are met, the analogy to foreign corporations would seem to be
of almost compelling force, and the same reasons for upholding jurisdiction'
in the one case would seem applicable in the other. It should be noted that
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the case of jurisdiction secured by virtue of the well known non-
resident motorist statutes.8 In rendering a judgment against a
non-resident who had been served in accordance with such a
statute, Rosenberry, J., said:
"Power to regulate is a basis for jurisdiction of equal dignity
[with that of the power to prohibit], and if as an incident to the
exercise 6f that power, the licensing state requires the foreign
motorist to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the state and
provides for service upon him in a manner reasonably calculated
to bring home to him notice of the pendency of the suit, the regu-
lation is reasonable and valid." 9
These views may be regarded as developments from the old
"physical power" "I and "consent" theories of jurisdiction to some
new theory based upon necessity and convenience,", suggesting,
perhaps, a trend toward civil law concepts of jurisdiction."
the person upon whom process was served in the Fle ner case was no longer
.an agent of the nonresident defendant. Therefore the decision on its facts
-would not preclude the upholding of jurisdiction in this situation. Cf. Scot,
op. cit. supra at 889.
S Even assuming that a state might have the power to exclude a non-res-
ident motorist from entering its boundaries to do intrastate business, the
power so to exclude such nonresident motorists who are engaged in inter-
.state commerce would seem to be lacking, as in the case of foreign corpo-
rations so engaged; and hence the argument that a state may impose a sub-
mission to its jurisdiction as a condition upon allowing the doing of the acts
within the state would seem inadequate. Yet statutes imposing such sub-
mission have been upheld. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct.
.30 (1916). And judgments against nonresidents have been upheld as con-
stitutional when jurisdiction was obtained through service of process in ac-
cordance with such statutes. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. CtL
632 (1927); State ex rel. Cronkhite v. Belden, 193 Wis. 145, 211 N. W. 916
(1927), rehearing denied, 214 N. W. 460 (Wis. 1927). Although these case3
do not squarely present the conflict of laws question of jurisdiction, since
the recognition in other states of the rights created by the judgment was
not before the courts, the objections to the jurisdiction were raised, and the
decisions are strongly indicative of what the courts regard as pre-requisitea
-or jurisdiction.
9 Cronkhite v. Belden, supra note 8.
1 'The proposition that jurisdiction in personam is based on physical power
]Ias been advanced as a foundation for an approach to the problems which
arise in determining the existence of jurisdiction in personam. Cf. Holmes,
J., in McDonald v. Mabee, supra note 1; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 1, at
135; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAwS (8th ed. 1883) § 539 et seq.
"I Cf. Scott, JurEsdiction Over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 HARV. L.
IRuv. 563; Comment (1925) 34 YALu L. J. 415.
1 Thus, in French law, domicil seems to be the fundamental basis of juris-
diction; but in commercial transactions, the French courts have jurisdiction
over suits on foreign contracts if the defendant is domiciled in France, if
the promise was made in France, or if the delivery or payment was to be
made in France. And in tort actions, the French courts have jurisdiction
if the tort was committed in France, in addition to jurisdiction bsed upon
19301
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The function of the requirement of jurisdiction would seem to
be to assure as far as practicable a suit which is fair to both the
defendant and the plaintiff in the matter of locale. The question
resolves itself into a balancing of such considerations as notice
to the defendant and an adequate opportunity to defend,13 reason-
able convenience to the plaintiff in bringing his suit, and cer-
tainty as to the place where an individual may be sued. In the
ordinary factual situation there is probably a close connection
between the particular political unit in which the defendant
habitually is and the place where he has an adequate opportunity
to defend a suit. And inasmuch as the plaintiff is the aggressor,
it does not seem unreasonable to compel him to bring suit at that
place. Therefore, in the interest of certainty, an arbitrary rule
seems to have been made to include the great bulk of cases.
But the injustice of such a rule is manifest in a number of situ-
ations, the most notable of them having received attention in the
foregoing discussion. Here, the hardship which would otherwise
be imposed upon the plaintiff is lessened by allowing him to bring
suit at a place with which the defendant has been or is in some
way connected, though he is not there present.
Similarly, it may be argued that the defendant's presence is
not sufficient in all cases to justify subjecting him to suit in that
locality. But the courts have regarded actual presence, even
though temporary, as sufficient to support jurisdiction,1 in the
domicil. Cf. Lorenzen, French Rules of the Conflict. of Laws (1927) 36
YALE L. J. 731, 738 et seq.
In German law, the state in which performance of a contract is to take
place has jurisdiction. GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 29. This rule
is interpreted to give jurisdiction over each particular obligation of the
contract to the state in which it was performable. Cf. 1 GAUPP-STEIN, DI)
ZIVMPROZESSORDNUNG FUR DAS DEUTSCHE REICH (14th ed. by Martin Jonas
1928) 110 et seq. Jurisdiction over torts lies at the place where the tort ir
committed. GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 32. The place where the
tort is committed is at each place where any substantial part of the act oc-
curred. Cf. 1 GAUPP-STEIN, op. cit. supra at 117 et eeq. See in general,
Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts Over Foreigners (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv.
193, 283.
13 Notice to the defendant and an adequate opportunity to defend alone
are not sufficient to support jurisdiction. Cf. Scott, op. cit. supra note 7,
at 873.
14Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 Aft. 714 (1895), 32 L. R. A. 236
(1896); cf. Hines v. Moore, 148 S. E. 162 (Ga. 1929).
The existence of jurisdiction is put to a more severe test in the cases
where the defendant appears specially to object to the court's jurisdiction.
Cf. York v. Texas, supra note 6. But Harris v. Taylor, [1915] 2 K. B.
580 seems to be a direct holding that the court in such case has jurisdiction,
and that its judgment is entitled to recognition as based upon sufficient
jurisdiction. Cf. also Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25, 37 Sup.
Ct. 492 (1917), where a judgment was held entitled to recognition in a
sister state when jurisdiction was acquired by the filing of a plea in abate-
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-absence of force or fraud in procuring such presence within the
state.
With reference to the effect of force or fraud in bringing the
defendant within the state, the American Law Institute has re-
-cently proposed a change of Section 83 of the Restate nt of the
(onflict of Laws into two sections, which read as follows:
"Section 83. Individual Voluntarily Within the State.
"A State can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an
individual voluntarily within its territory whether he is perma-
nently or only temporarily there, except as stated in Section 45.
"Section 83A. Individual Involuntarily Within the State.
"A state cannot exercise jurisdiction through the courts over
-an individual brought into the state by force against his will,
wrongfully or by act of God, until he has had a reasonable op-
-portunity to leave the state." "
Section 83A would seem to contemplate a further disintegration
of the "physical power" theory by denying the state jurisdiction
in the situations named, even though the person is within the ter-
ritorial limits of the state. The fundamental distinction between
the two sections seems to be that jurisdiction is allowed if the in-
ment, which, in the original action, was deemed by the local law to give the
court jurisdiction. In these cases, the defendant has actually received
notice, and has an opportunity to defend. But see supra note 13. Cf. Hilton
v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139 (1895). It would reem doubtful
that the defendants relationship with the state is of such a character as to
justify the existence of jurisdiction over him. Cf. Pond v. Simpson, 251
Mass. 325, 146 N. E. 684 (1925). But it is true that he has entered the
state voluntarily for purposes of his own, and hence a court might not re-
gard his position as justifying a relaxation of the general rule.
On the question of jurisdiction over persons coming into a state as a party
or a witness in litigation in the courts of the statei cf. Rizo v. Burruel, 23
Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234 (1921), 19 A. L. R. 823 (1922). The state seems to
have jurisdiction, but usually refuses to exercise it. Cf. Longueville v. May,
115 Iowa 709, 87 N. W. 432 (1901) ; GOoRICH, op. cit. eupr. note 1, at 136.
- PRocEnDiNGs, Am. L. INsr. (1929). The old section read as follows:
"See- 83. A State c n exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an in-
dividual within its territory whether he is permanently or only temporarily
there, except as stated in Section 45." CoNFLiCT OF LAWS ,RzraTELMNIz
(Am. L. Inst. 1926) § 83. It should be noted that this old § 83 was a
definition of § 82 (a), which section reads as follows:
"Sec. 82. The exercise of jurisdiction by a state through its courts over
an individual may be based upon any one of the following facts:
"(a) He is personally present within the state;
"(b) He has his domicil within the state;
"'(e) He is a citizen or subject owing allegiance to the state;
"(d) He has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction;
"(e) He has by acts done or caused to be done by him within the state
subjected himself to the jurisdiction."
Section 82 (a) as defined by the old § 83, would seem to be the only basis




dividual has entered the territory of a state through the exercise
of the will, but it is denied if his entrance was without the exer-
cise of the will. A theory has heretofore been advanced that
both fraud and force present no jurisdictional defect, but affect
merely the discretion to exercise jurisdiction."
The situation where the defendant is brought into the state by
the use of force has been little litigated. A recent opinion, al-
though it did not involve the recognition of rights created by the
judgment of another state, has flatly expressed the rule to be that
a court, under such circumstances, has no jurisdiction.17 An
argument can be made that since the creation of the relationship
between the state and the individual arising from the fact of his
presence within its boundaries was involuntary upon his part, a
court called upon to give effect to a judgment rendered under
such circumstances might well feel that too great a hardship had
been imposed upon the defendant, even though the plaintiff was
not the one guilty of the exercise of force.1, But if the defendant
should remain within the territory of the state after he had a
reasonable opportunity to leave, no particular hardship would
seem to be imposed upon him by subjecting him to suit within the
state, and the reason for the refusal of other courts to recognize
a judgment rendered against him would disappear. But the rule
set forth in Section 83A seems too broad in that it regards the
question only from the defendant's point of view. Suppose one
were brought into a state through force exercised by some third
party, and in attempting to leave the state injured the plaintiff,
who served him with process before his exit. Section 83A would
seem to compel the plaintiff to follow the defendant to his own
16 Beale, The Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners (1913) 26 HARv. L.
REv. 283, 285; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1916) § 83,
comment (e).
17 Ex parte Edwards, 278 Pac. 910 (Cal. 1929). In this case, a minor was
forced to come from a county in which he was living to another county by
order of the latter county. The court, after deciding the case to be a civil
action, said: ...... in a civil case jurisdiction cannot be obtained over the
person of one who is forcibly brought within the territorial limits of the
court." No authority, however, was cited for this statement. Cf. Ziporkes
v. Chmelniker, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 215 (1888) (evidence here did not support
the allegation of force.
-8 But it may well be that a greater hardship will be imposed upon the
plaintiff in not allowing his suit. Suppose A steals a horse from B in New
York, and escapes to Connecticut. He is subsequently arrested and extra-
dited. B sues in New York to recover the horse or its value, and recovers
judgment. But all A's property is in New Jersey. Why should not the
judgment be recognized there?
The courts are not in accord as to the immunity of a non-resident de-
fendant in a criminal case from service ol civil process. Cf. Church v.
Church, 270 Fed. 361 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1921); Note (1921) 14 A. L. R.
769; Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. Rnv. 802.
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state. An exception might well be made as to causes of action
arising from acts done by the defendant while -within the state's
boundaries.
The question now arises as to the effect of fraud. If the plain-
tiff was guilty of fraud which induced the defendant to enter the
state it would materially affect his relationship with the de-
fendant, and the court might well refuse to exercise jurisdiction"
But if a court of the state did exercise jurisdiction, the judgment
should be entitled to recognition in other states insofar as the
jurisdictional question is concerned20 The reaction of courts of
other states to such a judgment would seem to be directed more
toward the fact that an individual has procured the judgment by
"fraud" rather than that the state has imposed an undue hard-
ship upon the defendant by assuming jurisdiction over hin.L
This would seem to present a question of setting aside a judgment
because of fraud in its procurement, rather than a jurisdictional
question, to be governed by quite different rules.2 2 Thus, if the
IsIn the following cases the courts refused to exercise jurisdiction for
this reason: Williams v. Reed, 29 N. J. L. 385 (1862); Copas v. Anglo-
American Provision Co., 73 Mich. 541, 41 N. W. 690 (1889); Fitzgerald &
Mallory Construction Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98, 11 Sup. Ct. 36 (1890);
Heston v. Heston, 52 N. J. Eq. 91, 28 Atl. 8 (1893); Graves v. Graham, 19
Misc. 618, 44 N. Y. Supp. 415 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1897); Cavanagh v.
Manhattan Transit Co., 133 Fed. 818 (C. C. D. N. J. 1905); Commercial
Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 29 Sup. Ct. 445 (1909) ; Cran-
dall v. Trowbridge, 170 Iowa 155, 150 N. W. 669 (1915), Ann. Cas. 1916C
608; Van Donselaar v. Jones, 195 Iowa 1081, 192 N. W. 22 (1923); Abel
v. Smith, 144 S. E. 616 (Va. 1928); (1929) 27 Micn. L. Rv., 575.
20 Cf. Jaster v. Currie, 198 U. S. 144, 25 Sup. Ct. 614 (1905), where it
was held that an Ohio judgment rendered against a defendant who was
inveigled into the state was entitled to full faith and credit. It would seem
that the Ohio court had jurisdiction; and that the issue raised was not an
attempted impeachment of the court's jurisdiction, but an attempted setting
aside of the judgment on grounds of fraud in its procurement. The Su-
preme Court found no actual misrepresentation, since the facts which in-
duced the defendant to enter the state actually took place, although their
sole purpose was to obtain the presence of the defendant within the state.
Furthermore, the question of service was litigated in the original action.
It would seem that most cases in which a defendant is inveigled into a
state would involve no actual misrepresentation, but such fact would seem
immaterial on the jurisdictional issue, and would go to the question of fraud
in the procurement of the judgment.
21 Of course there may be reasons for refusing to recognize rights
created by a foreign judgment other than lack of jurisdiction. Among
these are fraud in procuring the judgment, the public policy of the forum,
and the penal nature of a judgment. On such questions, see GOODIUCa,
op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 202-205; 3 FREEmAN, JUDGMEN-TS (5th ed. 1925)
§§ 1483 et seq., 1492 et seq.
22 An equitable plea, based on the fraudulent procuring of jurisdiction
by the plaintiff, might well be upheld. Cf. Peel v. January, 35 Ark. 331
(1880). The modern view is that a defendant may plead any circumstances
of fraud which would have justified a court of equity of the original state
1930]
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question of "fraud" was litigated in the original action, the mat-
ter should be regarded as closed rather than allow its re-opening
upon a plea that the court rendering the judgment was without
jurisdiction." The distinction between the question of fraud.by
an individual in procuring a defendant's presence within a state
and the question of jurisdiction by the state over his person may
be well illustrated by cases in which the plaintiff was not guilty
of the fraudY6 As to such suits the defendant has entered the
state intentionally, and his opportunity to defend may well be re-
garded as not sufficiently impaired to cause a relaxation of the
rule that an individual is subject to suit where he is found.
There remain to be considered those cases where an individual
is regarded as being voluntarily before the court, although he is
in fact outside the boundaies of the state. Such are the cases
wherein jurisdiction over the defendant is founded upon the exe-
cution of a power of attorney to confess judgment. Section 83
should not be construed to apply here. Probably the better view
is that in these cases jurisdiction is based on factual consent; 21
and if the consent was obtained by fraud, it could be regarded as
ineffectual in conferring jurisdiction. Another view would seem
possible-that the defendant is voluntarily present within the
state through his attorney.26 Here, the entire basis for jurisdic-
tion is the contract containing the power of attorney, there being
no such basis as a relationship to the state created by the actual
presence of the defendant. Hence, if the contract was obtained by
fraud, the fraud would seem to go directly to the question of
jurisdiction. Also, as a practical matter, in such a situation, the
defendant would never have an adequate opportunity to defend.
in interfering in his behalf. Cf. Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N. C. 482, 55 S. E.
371 (1906), 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 905 (1911); Schendel v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry., 168 Minn. 152, 210 N. W. 70 (1926) ; Note (1926) 25 MiCu. L. REv.
176. Cases which have refused recognition to judgments based on jurisdic-
tion procured by fraud seem to have set forth this principle. Cf. Dunlap
& Co. v. Cody, 31 Iowa 260 (1871); Toof v. Foley, 87 Iowa 8, 54 N. W. 59
(1893); Abercrombie v. Abercrombie, 64 Kan. 29, 67 Pac. 539 (1902).
Contra: Pitcher v. Graham, 9 Ohio C. D. 825 (1899).
23 This argument would seem to apply almost equally as well to the
"force" situations. However, a possible distinction may be based upon the
fact that in the force situation, since the defendant did not intend to enter
the state, it cannot be as reasonably assumed that his opportunity to defend
is as adequate as in the case where he intended to make such entrance.
24 Cf. Beale, op. cit. supra note 12, at 285. The fact that a third person,
not guilty of fraudulently inveigling the defendant into the state, can ob-
tain a judgment against him is regarded as proving that the state has
jurisdiction. McLain v. Parker, 88 Kan. 717, 129 Pac. 1140 (1913) (suit
on a judgment); of. Ex parte Taylor, 29 R. I. 129, 69 Atl. 553 (1908).
25 See supra note 5.
26 Cf. Cuykendall v. Doe, 129 Iowa 453, 105 N. W. 698, 3 L. R. A. (N. 8.)
449 (1906) ; Williams v. Hirschfield, 32 Okla. 598, 122 Pac. 539 (1912).
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To deny a defendant the right to impeach such a judgment on
the ground that the court rendering it was without jurisdiction
would seem to be a great hardship upon him, and the courts have
not denied him such right.?y
- Malone v. Bocker, 82 Misc. 438, 143 N. Y. Supp. 1095 (1st Dep't 1913);
Cohn, Baer & Berman v. Bromberg, 185 Iowa 298, 170 N. W. 478 (1919);
Ashby v. Manley, 191 Iowa 113, 181 N. W. 869 (1921) ; Crim v. Crim, 162
Mo. 544, 63 S. W. 489 (1901), 54 L. R. A. 502 (1902).
